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AIR CANADA

AIR CANADA AND THE CANADA-U.S. OPEN SKIES
AGREEMENT OF FEBRUARY 24,1995:
A GOOD STORY

The Air Transport Research Group (ATRG) Conference
25-27 June 1997, Vancouver

.....

AIR CANADA TRAMSBORDER NETWORK
PRIOR TO US, OPEN SKIES (FEB. '95)
o

9 SCHEDULED DESTONATIONS

-

o

Boston, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Newark,
New York, San Francisco, Tampa
All around t h e edges of the U.S.
''heartland".

- nothing in the

5 AbDlTlONAL SCHEDULED DESTIMTIONS SERVED BY AIR CANADA'S
WHOLLY-OWNED REGIONAL AIRLINES

-

Baltimore, Cleveland, ~ a r t f o r hPortland
,
(OR),Seattle

o

32 SCHEDULED ROUTES (CIN-PAIRS) OPERATED BY AIR CANADA
AND ITS RECIONALS FOR A TOTAL OF 650 WEEKLY FLIGHTS EACH WAY

o

7 CHARTER DESTINATIONS ALSO SERVED BY AIR CANADA ON A
SEASONAL BASIS

-

Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers, Honolulu, LaS Vegas, Maui,
Orlando, West Palm Beach

NEW AIR CANADA TRANSBORDER ROUTES
PURSUANT TO OPEN SKIES
o

a

24 NEW DESTINATIONS (CITIES) SERVED WITH "OWN AIRCRAFT"

-

5 destinations were introduced by Air Canada's Regional Airlines

TRANSLATE INTO 39 NEW ROUTES (CITY-PAIRS) OPERATED WITH
"OWN AIRCRAFT"

o

7 of which are conversion of charter into scheduled destinations

I 1 routes converted from charter into scheduled services

6 were introduced by Air Canada's Regional Airlines

OVER 1,200 WEEKLY TRANSBORDER FLIGHTS EACH WAY OPERATED BY
AIR CANADA AND ITS REGIONALS

-

,

24 NEW CITIES SERVED WITH
AC <<OWNAlRCRAFh
I 9 BY AIR CANADA

5 BY AC REGIONALS ONLY

7 DESTINATIONS CONVBtTED
FROM CHARTER TO SCHEDULED

12 NEW DESTlNATiONS

Fort Lauderdale (95)

Atlanta (95)

Allentown, PA (96)

Fort Myers (95)

Charlotte (97)

Columbus, OH (95)

Hon~lulU(95)

DallaslFt. Worth (97)

Harrisburg, PA (96)

Las Vegas (95)

Denver (95)

Richmond, VA (Jul. 97)

Maul (95)

Kansas City (96)

Spokane, WA (96)

Orlando (95)

Mlnneapolls-St. Paul (95)

West Palm Beach (95)

Nashville (96)
Phlladelphla (96)
Phoenlx (97)

st. Louis (95)
Washington (DCAfIAD) (95)

ALLIANCE WITH UNITED FURTHER EXPANDS
AIR CANADA'S ACCESS TO THE US.

o

50 NEW DESTINATIONS (CITIES) ADDED TO AIR CANADA U.S. NETWORK
THROUGH CODESHARING WITH UNITED AIRLINES

o

in addition to 38 cities served with Air Canada "own aircraft"

CODNHARE WITH UNITED AIRLINES ON 84 CITY-PAIRS WITHIN THE U.S.
FOR OVER 1200 FLIGHTSIWEEK

AIR CANADA TRANSBORDER NETWORK (JULY '971
o

88 DESTINATIONS IN THE U.S.

*
o

38 served with "awn aircraftw
SO served through code-sharing with United Airlines

Pre-Open Skies destinations

=

3 4 scheduled

+

7 charter

67 TRANSBORDER ROUTES (CITY-PAIRS) SERVED WITH "OWN AIRCRAFT"
SUPPLEMENTED BY:

o

-

Code-share on 6 transborder routes operated by United Airlines

-

Code-share on 84 city-pairs wittiin

*

Pre-Open Skies routes

=

-

the U.S. served by UA

32

OVER 1,200 WEEKLY TRANSBORDER FLIGHTS OPERATED WITH "OWN AIRCRAFT"
SUPPLEMENTED BY:

-

1,200 code-share f lights/week on United Airlines

*

Pre-Open Skies weekly flights

= 651

-

Transborder Market Share Up 40%
YOSales

J

F

M

1

1

1

A

M

J

1

J

1

A

w

S

1

O

1

1

N

D

J

9

F

1

M

1

1

-

1

A

M

J

J

-

A

I

S

9

O

-

N

1

D

b

1995

*Scheduled service only

1996

-

w

-

J

F

M

1997

A

Toronto Based Market Share U p 48%
YOSales

*Scheduled service only
AIR CANADA

6

o

AIR CANADA WAS READY FOR OPEN SKIES WITH THE U,S,

-

-

~ullyprivatized in 1989
Major restructuring in early 1990s
Ordered new aircraft (Lee24 CRJs and 35 A319s)

o

AIR CANADA WELL-ESTABLISHED IN CANADA WHERE TWO-THIRDS OF
TRANSBORDER TRAFFIC ORllGINATES

o

AIR CANADA HAS BEEN VERY EFFECTIVE IN PENETRATING THE U.S,
INTERIOR DUE TO:

-

Strength of I t s Toronto hub
United Airlines Alliance

-

CRJS particularly in low density markets and

high frequency potential

- .
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NOTES FOR A PRESENTATION
TO
OPENING PLENARY SESSION, ATRG CONFERENCE

-

VANCOUVER JUNE 26,1997

R.R. Mayes
Transport Canada

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. As one of the first speakers to take the
podium this morning, 1would like to take this opportunity, first, to welcome our
many distinguished visitors from all around the world to Canada, and more
particularly, to Vancouver. Secondly, I would like to congratulate the organizers for
bringing together such a formidable array of knowledge and talent for these
discussions and presentations. (I will exempt myself from that comment.)
Our opening subject is "current and fiture issues in international air policy". There
is so much expertise in this room that I feel definitely intimidated!
However, perhaps I can add something to the debate by dusting off a few truths we
need to keep in mind. Perhaps, also I can add to the challenge by pointing out a few
issues that may make it harder for air services to develop in just the way that some
believe they will or they should. So, I will hope to leave you with a few thoughts
that will stay with you as you follow, or participate in, the discussions of the next
two days.
I think that, as a government official, it is incumbent upon me to reflect a
government point of view. Now, some of you may wonder, what's new or different
about that. Well, in some quarters, there is a rather facile assumption building that
the nation state is fast withering away and it merely remains a husk of its former self

- principally existing to normalize economic relations of rapidly globalising
companies.

While this point of view can be viewed as an extreme - because it takes, as a given,
that recent trends with regard to the role of government will continue unchecked - it
is not entirely without foundation. Let me start by reviewing some of the elements
of that trend, using our experience in Canada by way of illustration.
Over the past four years, we have made unprecedented changes to the role of
government. This has been particularly true in the transportation sector.
Our current approach concentrates on: setting a framework of policy and
legislation, developing and enforcing regulations and standards and, finally,
monitoring the transportation sector's performance.
To illustrate, over the past several years, the government has pursued a number of
initiatives that have:
First, through policy and regulatory measures, made Canadian transportation more
subject to the disciplines of the marketplace and less to those of the economic
regulator.
Second, commercialized or divested transportation infrastructure to local authorities
and communities and to other entities that are commercially oriented.
Last, shifted the burden of costs fiom the general taxpayer to the specific user of the
service through subsidy reduction (or elimination) and cost recovery.

That's on the internal, or domestic front. In the international arena, Canada has
pursued progressive liberalization of the framework within which air transport
services are operated. For example, we have our agreement with the US, our liberal
bilaterals with the UK and Germany and our adjustments to our International Air
Transportation Policy announced in December 1994, wherein Canadian carriers
must use their route rights or risk losing them.
Clearly, with all these changes, it is not difficult to see why some observers have felt
that governments are withdrawing fiom the field.
However, in our view, we have merely brought our role up to date and clarified it.
Indeed, in some instances, we have enlarged it. Government has reduced its role as
a provider of transportation services and related infrastructure, has removed itself
f?om the day to day conduct of activities, but has firmly planted itself watchfully on
the sidelines, as a sort of referee, to ensure that the game is played fairly and
according to those rules that remain.

Two examples. First, safety remains a core government responsibility. After
several years of intensive and open review, new Canadian Aviation Regulations
came into effect in October 1996. A most notable aspect was the process by which
these new regulations were developed - in close consultation and collaboration with,
not only those whose behaviour they are meant to govern, but also with other
affected or interested parties such as employees (and their union representatives)
and users, both shippers and travellers. The new regulations and standards that

complement them are more complete and comprehensible than the previous system
of regulations and orders. They are intended not only to maintain but to enhance
aviation safety.
The noteworthy aspect of this is that we have changed the way we do the business
we do. Governments must increasingly respond to the concerns and interests of a
broad range of stakeholders. The cozy club between industry and regulators,
whether they be economic or operational regulators, has been expanded to allow
others to join. And I will boldly predict that, as economies develop and populations
become better educated and more sophisticated around the globe, governments
almost everywhere will have to adopt comparable approaches, i.e. they will have to
involve consumers, travellers and shippers, in their decision making processes.
Please do not lose sight of this thought.
And in keeping with that thought, I would add this further one as its counterpart. In
Canada, transparency and fairness to the consumer are major objectives of our
policy. Hence, in the changes to our licensing legislation last year, we tightened up
several requirements relating to new carrier entry because of abuses and problems
we had experienced under our previous entry regime. Now, we prohibit ticket sales
prior to licensing and we require new carriers to demonstrate they are adequately
capitalized so that they do not depend on funds obtained from consumers to launch
their operations.

-

Whether we speak of the consumer, or the traveller, or the taxpayer or citizen all
of these categories of people have expectations of their elected representatives and
their governments. True, these may vary or change, depending on which view they
have of themselves in a given context or at a given time. Despite this complication,
which is part of what makes being in government so stimulating, there are still some
obvious truths here as well.
If you are travelling internationally, on a ticket bought in one country, to be used on

the carrier of a third country, and your flight is delayed, causing your travel plans
fall apart - how do you obtain redress? If your luggage is misplaced when you are
thousands of miles fi-om home and the local carriers don't care to respond, where do
you go for help?
Governments/Ministers receive complaints. These come fi-om people who pay taxes
and vote. The message here is that either the industry has adequate mechanisms to
deal with these situations, or governments will come under pressure to create
regulations or other mechanisms for dealing with them. Let me close on this thought
with two words - "code sharing". .. . A growing area of carrier activity, an area
fi-aughtwith potential concerns regarding transparency for consumers. A word to
the wise perhaps ... ?
Another set of pressures that is emerging for governments is the environmental
impact of transportation.

The transportation sector presents major challenges for sustainable development.
The actual and potential global effects are sigmficant and you know the litany:
climate change, noise, the consumption of non-renewable resources, the depletion of
the ozone layer, the contamination of water supplies, and the disruption of wildlife
habitats. And those are just the so-called ''soft" issues. Predictions of virtually
exponential growth in air services (particularly in the Asia-Pacific region) imply
competition for scarce or non-renewable resources with other sectors of economic
activity. Runway expansion and airport expansion will become even more W c u l t
to undertake than they have been in the recent past.
In Canada, as of June of 1995, all federal ministers have an obligation to address

"sustainable development" within their area of responsibility. Every federal
department is required to table a sustainable development strategy in Parliament by
December of this year, outlining its goals and action plans for integrating sustainable
development into its policies, programs and operations. Each plan must include a
process of consultation with relevant stakeholders. "Sustainable transportation", of
course, will be the focus for Transport Canada.

A central feature of this process is the integration, fiom the outset, of environmental
considerations into decision-making.

The legislative and institutional framework also includes Canada's participation in
multilateral bodies - such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) that set standards and seek multilateral consensus on transportation issues, including
its impact on the environment. An example is ICAO's most recent standard for
aircraft engine emissions, itself a 20 percent reduction from the previous limit.

Other multilateral bodies (such as the OECD and the United Nations Commission
on Sustainable Development) are also addressing the challenges presented by the
transportation sector for global sustainable development and it is not always
possible to see or to believe that the efforts are coordinated.. .
Nevertheless, in the spring of 1996, Transport Canada outlined a framework for its
sustainable transportation strategy. The department is currently conducting
consultations with stakeholders to help define strategic directions from the following
perspectives:
where Transport Canada can act on its own authority
where it can act in partnership with others
where it can encourage others to take preferred action

The strategy will have to provide the basis for fostering sustainable development
within the national transportation system and will also set the fiarnework within
which the department will report to the Commissioner of the Environment and
Sustainable Development on the department's environmental progress.

Having said all this, it is not at all certain how the various pressures will play out.
The situation may be confused but it is very clear - the issue is not going to go
away. Business '?is usual" will no longer be "usual".
The third and final perspective I would like to cover this morning concerns the
interface between trade agreements and air services agreements.
Over the past ten years, Canada has been very progressive in the trade field beginning with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Canada and the U.S. in
1988. (Since then we have been party to: NAFTA, FTAA, APEC, WTO and, for
good measure, we have negotiated bilateral agreements, inter alia, with Israel and
Chile.)
However, it is worth noting that with the exceptions of a few ancillary issues, air
services, per se, have been excluded fiom these fi-ee trade arrangements.
Reflecting for a moment on the Canada - U.S. situation, this is the largest bilateral
trading relationship in the world - approximately $lB of trade occurs per day
between the two countries. While the FTA was signed in 1988, the so-called Open
Skies agreement was not signed until 1995. That is, a full seven years elapsed
between the finalization of the two agreements.
This underscores the fact that trade in goods and services in general and
liberalization in air senices in particular are both occurring but not at the same rate.
This illustrates the point that as far as Canada is concerned, we are pragmatists.

We are not convinced that "one size fits all" liberalization is appropriate for us. We
have negotiated - and will continue to negotiate - more open agreements as markets
mature. I mentioned earlier our agreements with the US, the UK and with Germany.
For our part, participation in the recent OECD study - and you will hear more on
that later &om Dr. Button - was a very useful exercise. In fact, we have sought to
go further by developing a cost-benefit methodology which integrates both
transportation and trade effects. We have now received the h a l software and are
becoming thoroughly acquainted with it. If all goes well, we will be making this
model available to interested countries later this year.
These three examples - consumers, the envir~nmentand the link with trade
agreements - are just some of the issues which national governments must address
when dealing with matters relating to air services. They are increasingly a factor in
the decision making processes of governments and there is every indication they will
continue to be. If one contemplates the fbture development of air transportation,
whether at the national or international level, without bearing in mind both the direct
impact of these types of matters on the industry itself, the recommendations of
bureaucrats and on the eventual decisions of politicians, one risks being naively in
error.

This, then, is the final thought I want to leave with you. Do not underestimate the
potential for seemhgly soft or inconsequential matters to complicate and delay
governmental decision making. On the other hand, be ready to consider direct
solutions to a problem, even if they initially seem intractable. Therein lies the
paradox!

I hope my comments have been helpful. I will be glad to answer questions in the
second part of our session.
Thank you.
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Remarks at PIamqy Symposium
Yasuo SAKAKIBARA
(Osaka University of Cornrnerce)
Internationd a M o n in Japan f k e s simhi- issues as in other counMes,
and 1 a m somewhat pessimistic about Japan's capability to cope with
those issues. The Ministry of Transport in Japan (JMOT) has bken
some measures to UberaLize domestic a-n,
but has not done much in
international aviation.

There are at least three factars that will continue to impact the
formulation of international a m o n poxcry i tl Japan.
One such factor is an absolute shortage of&port capacity: c ~ t l y o d y
a total of two runways in two airports, Narlta ,and Kausai, are lWtdUng 80
percent of the international gassengem and freight. The JMOT wiil be
building two more runways at N a i t a , but: six farmers have not cansetltcd
to sell their land for tke proposed runways. Kansai will soon start
reclamation of land on which a second =way will be built, but it will
take another eight years or so betbe the second runway is completed.

Japan has 90 ahparts altogether, but, because ofthe Egh h d price and
the lack of the concept of eminent domain, airports have been built
. wherever land or,for that matter, the sea is ar7ailabLe. Often rtdamation
of land is cheaper than the purchase of lancl1, but the sea is not a4i-e
good. There are pmperties d e d fishing rights. Unless you purchase
these fishing rights you can not change t h e sea; and as soon as the
Government tries to purchase the fishingrights, the number offishexmen
tends to increase. So Japanese airports are being built more in the
countryside than ntar the urban centers.

.

These newly built ahports in the countryside are small and can not
handle international passengers and .fM&t. Japan can expand them
but what airlines would like to fly into Shonai or Tajima, ahparts whose

. Yaeuo SAaAHIBARA, *I?lanningfor a New Gerwratio~.~
of Japanese Airports,'
Reg'udfiveIopraent Ih'alogus, Vol. 14,No.2, S m e 1993.
~
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names they never heard of.
I may add that our land price is high but not unreasonably so; the
Japanese highway authority ptmhases the nccessuy land for
c~nstructionat a price 25 times higher than the US Highway Authority,
on the average. But, if you compare GNP pr-oduccdper acre ofhabitable
land, d u d i n g tall mountains, lakes, desert, rivers etc., Japan produces
23 times more GNP per acre ofland than the US. More sdous problems
are small land holdings and the I& of enninent domain. in d e r to
build one--ter
of highway, yort may have to negotia.te with 100 or
more tandowners and receive consent to sell b m all of them. You can
imagine what would happen if you want to sccure 1,200 hectaees of flat
land suitable for an international airport that has three runvmys and a
large terdnd building.

The second kctor is the lack of competitiveneqs of Japanese internotioml
carriers. According to Professor Oum's study, if I ranemba cbmctly,
the cost per passenger kilometer of JAL and ANA is some 50 peRXSt
. higher than the cost of major US carriers. If Japan ~bemkes
international aviation now completely, the JMOT is afraid that Japanese
airlines woad have a great deal of dEculty and about 50,000 jobs
directly connected to aviation and another- 100,000 jobs in re3ated
industries may be afllected.

have to look into causes of the high cost of JAL and ANA. &sme
analysts emphasize Government regulations, some others high wages for
flight attendants and still others f d e r bedding as the cause. Z do not
deny the validity of these causes, but it looks i n me that mast are results
of the high yen price. Back in '85,240 yen equaled a do% now 120yen
or less equals a ddUar. Eight millionyaz yearly pay for a flight attendat
was $35,000 in 1985, but it is now $70,000. The purchasing power
parity between dollar and yen now stands at 180 yen to a ddIar. It tsok
: ten years to adjust to the lowering ofyen from 240 to 180,and it may take
another ten years to adjust to 120 yen to m e dollar. It is not easy to
rmve prices and wages downwards, so the aviation industry has waited .
for foreign prices to go up.
We

:

In other words, we ham to consider what will happen to the cx&m&e
ratio in the future as welt as other dynamic factors in conaidering the
future performance of Japanese d e r s .
1

am for libemlhtion of international aviation, and immediate

liberalization mry speed up the process. Economists can argue
somewhat inresponsibly that, even ff JAL slnd ANA M ,Japaaeee
consumers would be better off because they could travd at cheaper
prices. For the JMOT, that sort of event is, and will be, an a b ~ l u ~
unthinkable situation.
The third factor is the nature and the s w e o f the administration of the

that
Japanese Government. For sorne reason, many foreigners assthe Japanese Government is a powerful policy maker and enforcer. Not
at all. The Japanese Government is tektively small in size, and most
. of'ficials were born after WWIX and believe in democracy. They are
careful in weighing public opinion and a variety of interests. ?*hat is
what politicians do in other countries. The 3 apanese Govenrment tends
to pursue a policy ofmaking the least numb&-of people unhappy. Time,
patience and money are its arms for implee n ting policies.

W e have a saying that a "rich ma# does not quarrel.' Our rich
government did not quafie1in the 70's and 80's, but now the government
is not rich anymore. Yet the government is still pla-g
the role of a
mediator among various interests, foreign pressure being a newcomer to
the interests, and not the enforcer. The goveranzent can take an
initiative; but if some powe.rit11element oppuses it, it tend8 to go laiss~zc
passe2 and time will become its only fiiend. You can not lcall it
"undemocratic." It is "too democratic" or "demacrvaq without
leadership."
So, I do not think that Japan will change its stance quickly. Only if
.libexdimtion of international aviation continves in Asia-Facjiic, if it8
impact on Japanese aviation is strongly felt, (already 10 p e m t of the
.Japanese passengers who go to Seoul b v e destinations ather than
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Korea), and if so-called 'foreign pressuren in wiation negotiations
continues, can w e expect gradual shifts tcpnards libaallearian end an
open s& in JMOT. Thus, it looks like too milch to ask of Japan to take
leadership in the UberaIization of intematimlal aviation in Asia and the
Pacific.
Thank you.

r
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June 26, 1997
Koki Nagata, Japan A i r l ines
I n i t i a t i v e s f o r Liberalization Asia-Pacific Aviation
Thank you Mr. Chai rman f o r your k i nd in t roducti on.
Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Iam delighted t o be here t o speak
about my vision on current Asia Pacific aviation.
It i s amazi ng t o see the extensive range o f avi a t i on issues t h i s conference
intends t o cover, eight sessions with some 100 presentations. It i s daunting
t o think, what my contribution might lead to.
My b r i e f i s t o give an overview o f how Japan A i r l ines sees the current state
o f US/Japan aviation relations, i n the 1i g h t o f the current "Open Skies"
pol i c y o f the United States with regard t o Asia.

(I).
Li beral izati on; US approach
Fi rst, a 1it t l e background : the US/Japan b i 1ateral avi a t i on agreement came
i n t o e f f e c t i n 1952 and i t would be true t o say t h a t ever since, Japan has
been t r y i ng t o r e c t i f y what was -and continues t o be- a grossl y imbalanced
treaty. The current situation i s the result o f attempts t o renegotiate
which started some 20 year ago.
What Japan seeks now i s unchanged from then. It i s simp1y "fai r and equal
opportunity". Comparing the basis o f debates over "Open Skies", i n the case
of Japan/US, we have not yet been successful i n leaving behind the post
war agreement o f 1952 unl ike the UK which achieved Bermuda I1 i n 1977. The
US/Japan 1952 agreement belongs t o history. That agreement i s so grossl y
imbalanced i n favor o f the US carriers t h a t there i s no incentive f o r US
side t o seriously negotiate with Japan.
Today, the US re1uctantl y admits t h i s imbalance. However thei r strategy
seems t o be that by disregarding such imbalance factors, they can b u l l doze
through t h e i r massive 1iberal iz a t i on proposals on1y t o further thei r
a i r l ines' interest .
But, these are the facts we must claim f o r redress, as a prerequisite t o

any new agreement.

1. Take Beyond Rights: US a i r l ines enjoy more than 150 f l ights a week beyond
Japan t o other Asian destinations, competi ng f reel y with Japanese and
Asian a i r l ines, whi l e Japanese a i r l ines are a11owed on1y two f l ights per
week from Los Angeles t o Brazil. US c a r r i e r s take about 1.6 m i l l i o n
passengers from Japan t o Asia compared t o 4000 passengers annual 1y on
JAL's Los Angeles t o Sao Paolo route.
S i m i 1ar r i g h t s f o r Japanese a i r l ines beyond the U. S. w i 11 never equal
the value of U. S. rights beyond Japan, so access beyond gateway c i t i e s
t o other destinations i n the Continental U. S. f o r international t r a f f i c
would be one way o f level ing the p l ayi ng f i e l d and balancing the present
r i g h t s disparity .
2. U. S. a i r l ines control 800 slots, one t h i r d o f f l week1y slots, at Japan's
major gateway, Narita Airport, and only s l i g h t l y less than the t o t a l
number o f weekly s l o t s used by a l l ' the a i r l i n e s o f Japan f o r a l l f l i g h t s
world wide.
O f these 800 U. S. slots, about 540 are used f o r f l ights between Japan
and U. S .and the rest f o r f 1ights beyond Japan. Japanese carriers' s l o t s
dedicated t o U. S. -Japan f l i g h t s number 270, ha1f the U. S. total f o r the
same services. Capacity a t ~ a rt ii i s frozen, yet the U. S. dominates,
a discrepancy t h a t arises d i r e c t l y from the imbalance inherent i n the
1952 agreement.
We woul d 1ike t o see some changes;
For example, the U. S.must open up access t o i t s domestic market t o foreign
ai r l ines. The restrictions on foreign ownership o f U. S. carries which
inhi b i t access shoul d be 1iberal ized.

A relaxation o f the U. S. government law t h a t dictates i t s employees f l y
on U. S. a i r l ines; no other advanced country has such a protective 1aw. JAL
cannot carry U. S. government employees, contractors or even U. S. mai 1 across
the Pacific. Japanese government o f f i c i a1s are free t o f 1y with whom they
p l ease.

It i s easy and misleading f o r US defenders o f "Open Skies" t o repeatedly
maintain t h a t Japanese a i r l ines are saddled with high costs, are not
competitive and re1y on Government protection. A decade ago, our costs were
20 t o 30 percent below U. S. carriers, measured i n do1l a r s and cents. Today
the reverse appears true, but consider t h a t the yen/dol l a r s exchange rate
has changed completely, from 240 yen t o the do1 1ar i n 1985 t o about 115
yen t o the do1l a r today. JAL's costs expressed i n yen, are steadi 1y
decreasing as our restructuring proceeds.
So much f o r Japan-U. S. re1ations. But Iplaced speci a1 emphasis on Beyond
Rights or 5th freedom r i g h t s because they are contentious issues i n the
Asian region, especially when there are shortages i n a i rport capacity i n
t h i s area.
As in current UK/US negotiations, the Japan/US case contai ns a i rport s l o t
problems, The former a t London Heathrow i n regard t o the question whether
the proposed BA/AA a11iance is too domi nant f o r f a i r competi ti on, the 1a t t e r
appl i e s usage o f Tokyo's Nari t a A i rport. Due t o foreseen a i rport s l o t
shortages, the best and most e f f i c i e n t u t i 1iz a t i on o f 1im i ted s l o t s need
t o be appraised. These needs are a1ready acute a t major a i rports, urging
an international rule f o r s l o t allocation t o decide p r i o r i t i e s by f l i g h t s .
I n Asia too, the increasing number o f f l i g h t s and new entrants i n a11
a i rports w i 11 force government authori ti es t o revi ew conventi onal methods
o f s l o t a1locations i n order t o best u t i l i z e them.

(11). Liberalization; ICAO mu1ti l a t e r a l approach
A i r t ransportati on is counted as an integral p a r t o f t o t a l economi c
a c t i v i ti es by most countries, therefore governments p l ay an important role
in s e t t i ng pol ic i es t o promote a i r transportation. Among such pol icies f o r
example, are 1iberal izati on of currency exchange and foreign investment,
visa waivers f o r foreign v i s i t o r s and easy procedures f o r obtaining passport
f o r thei r nationals.
Governments would undertake large scale expansion i n such key
infrastructure as airport, ground access f a c i l i t i e s , a i r t r a f f i c control,
and navigation aids system i n the ai r, i f they f i n d strategic importance

i n such investment and also they w i 11 introduce less r e s t r i c t i v e foreign
policies together with more relaxed exchange of t r a f f i c r i g h t s and more
procompeti ti ve market policy f o r healthier development o f thei r aviation
indust r y .
Asi an count r ies have been successful 1y sustai n i ng heal thy growth in
respective industry i n the past decades and they w i 11 mai n t a i n t h i s even
i n more rapid expansion i n the future.
Each year the member a i r l ines of the regi on AAPA(Associ a t i on o f Asi a Paci f ic
Airlines, former OAAj Orient Airlines Association) have proudly reported
about p r o f i t a b l e operations with a high rate o f sustained growth, and the
qua1it y o f t h e i r services has never been compromised.
Just two decades ago, there were 29 internati onal scheduled a i r l ines i n
Asi a, most o f whi ch were government owned nati onal f 1ag car r iers . But today,
the number has doubl ed . Some
have p r i v a t i zed thei r a i r l ines
and i n v i t e d new a i r l ines t o enter i n t o international competition by giving
mu1ti p l e desi gnati on status under the b i 1ateral system.
The World Air T r a f f i c Conference of ICAO i n 1994 triggered l i v e l y
d i scussi ons f o r g l obal 1iberal izati on in response t o c r i ti c i sm that the
current b i l a t e r a l system i s a1 ready too r e s t r i c t i v e f o r future aviation.
Fol1owi ng one week's d i scussi ons on a d r a f t mu1ti 1ateral agreement prototype
presented by ICAO's secretariat, i t was d i rected t h a t ICAO ATRP(Ai r
Transport Regulatory Panel ) be reconvened and i t should further study on
"safe guard mechanism", "safety net", "ownershi p and control", "doing
business", "preferenti a1 measures f o r small e r and less competitive
carriers" i n order t o give assurances t o a i r l ines who want t o participate
i n global aviation network and competition. The report i s due i n the fa11
1998 f o r the t r i e n n i a1 ICAO Assembly.
Duri ng the meeti ng, 1iberal izati on devel opments on a regi onal 1eve1 , such
as those i n the European Union, drew many delegates' attention as good
examples f o r t h e i r studies and an option f o r further l i b e r a l i z a t i o n steps.

(111). Liberalization; Regional approach

I n January 1996, the f i r s t meeting o f Regional Cooperation Forum f o r
International A i r Transport i n Asia and Oceania was held i n Kyoto.
Representatives o f the aviation authorities from 13 countries and a i r l ines
discussed the rapid development i n the region and possible measures t o
enhance regi onal cooperati on among the countries in the presence o f ICAO
representati ves. A1so exchanged were views regardi ng new a i r transportati on
regul a t i on.
The second meeting was held i n Bangkok i n March 1997. Exchange o f views
and information o f such issues as the promotion o f mu1ti p l e designation
o f a i r l ines, standard t e x t o f b i 1ateral a i r services agreement, a i rport
congestion, code-shari ng standardization, encouragement f o r cross border
trade and tourism under "growth areay' or "growth triangle" scheme f o r an
exampl e, Indonesi a, Ma1aysi a, Thai 1and Growth T r i angl e, f a i r and equal
"competitive skies" rather than "open skies", and support f o r ICAO on
economi c issues and technical cooperati on.
It was agreed t o meet again i n early 1998 t o explore common ground i n the
future a i r transport regulation among Forum countries f o r 1998 ICAO
Assembl y .
As each country o f Asia has a different history and perspective i n thei r
pol ic i es and strategi es f o r avi a t i on devel opment , responses t o such a
proposal as the Open Skies model agreement are natural 1y diverse. Singapore
and Ma1aysi a formal 1y concl uded the agreement t h i s year, Brunei and Taiwan
have i n i t i a l e d and Korea i s negotiating f o r agreement with the U. S. The
Phi 1ippi nes, Thai 1and and Honkong had 1iberal ized agreements with the U. S.
before such model agreement was introduced. Countries which have not made
such agreements incl ude Indonesia, Vietnam, China and Japan.
On the other hand, a11 countries of Asia are aware t h a t the Asi a-Paci f i c
region w i l l be a d r i v i n g force i n the future growth o f the aviation industry.
Also they are well aware that seventy per cent o f the passenger t r a f f i c
in t h i s expandi ng regi on i s in t ra-regi onal t r a f f i c and Asi an carriers both,
incumbents and new entrants not unreasonably, feel they should have the
f i r s t claim f o r i t .
Further, the needs o f t h i r d country a i r l i n e participation based on o l d

beyond rights, such as those be1ongi ng t o the U. S., are regarded as
secondary.
A t Tokyo's Nari t a A i rport especi a11y, a 1arge number o f precious s l o t s are
bei ng occupied f o r services beyond Japan by U .S . carriers . Because today's
a i r c r a f t can serve d i r e c t l y t o many Asian points from U. S. without 1andi ng
a t crowded Narita, the need f o r t h i s occupation i s highly questionable
especially when there i s no quid pro quo f o r Japanese carriers i n the U. S.
Therefore such diversity i n stance o f aeropol iti cs d ~ e snot predicate the
base o f regional cooper a tive act iv i ti es . I n fact, regi onal coope r a tion
and communication are even more enhanced among government authorities and
a i r l ines, in response t o ext ra-regi onal development .
Concl usi on
"Open Skies" as currently peddled by the U. S. i s a prerequisite t o
considering anti-trust immunity fo'r commerci a1 a l l iances under U. S.
domestic laws. I n t h i s scheme, made i n USA, f a i r trading gives way t o
American mercanti 1is t approaches through the "Open Skies" pol i c y .

A respected academic conference such as t h i s could hardly approve such a
policy f o r a new world order t o rep1ace the current b i 1ateral system which
continues t o work well among Asian countries. But please do not
m i sunderstand, Iam not agai nst 1iberal izati on. Iam just sayi ng that there
should be better approaches t o reach the goal.
It i s about time f o r the US t o face the r e a l i t y o f world aviation today
and share a common goal with other countries more broadly i n order t o forge
a new world regulatory regime f o r c i v i 1 aviation, rather than sticking t o
an 01d fashioned mercanti 1is t approach simp1y t o further thei r own a i r l ines'
interests.

INITIATIVES FOR LIBERALISING
ASIA-PACIFIC AVIATION:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Mr Karmjit Singh
Assistant Director Corporate Affairs,
Singapore Airlines Ltd
University of British Columbia
26June1997
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The organisers of this conference must be congratulated for their impeccable timing. Even as
recently as six months ago, talk of "open skies" in Asia-Pacific was still mostly just that -talk. As
other regions such as Europe and North America have pressed ahead over recent years with
regulatory reform, Asia-Pacific has lagged well behind.
But since the start of this year, promising headway has been made - most notably, with the United
States' initiative to forge open skies accords with several Asian nations. I'm confident that the
U.S. move will prove to be the catalyst for reform on a much broader scale within the region,
rather than just restricted to isolated bilateral arrangements between countries.
Global Trends in Aviation Liberalisation
But before we attempt to chart a flight path for Open Skies within Asia-Pacific, let's put the
matter into context by reviewing recent progress achieved around the globe. Historically,
regulators have been slow to accommodate the commercial dynamics of the international aviation
industry. However, in many parts of the world, governments are recognising that less regulation
means better airlines, better service and a better deal for the travelling public - and, most
importantly, better prospects for economic growth, in terms of trade, tourism and investment.
This deregulatory trend has been particularly evident in Europe and North America. From the l*
of April this year, air travel between and within the 17 nations of the European Economic Area
(EEA) has become a single market. It means that all airlines registered in any of these countries
are now considered to be domestic carriers anywhere within the EEA. In terms of other
international destinations, however, these airlines are still bound by the restrictions of bilateral air
services agreements negotiated between their respective home countries and other nations.
Running parallel to the advent of this European single market has been the progress made to fiee
up the trans-Atlantic market. Since 1993, the US has signed "open skies" agreements with 11
European countries. The movement started with tiny Netherlands, continued with other small
countries like Austria and Switzerland, and gained momentum until the giant, Germany, found it
difficult not to have its own open-skies bilateral with the US. The United Kingdom is holding

out, but depending on how the proposed British Airways-American Airlines alliance develops, it
too many find open skies with the US irresistible.
On this side of the Atlantic, the US already has an open skies accord with Canada. The Cross
Border Air Transport Agreement is not quite as free as the European single market regime, as it
doesn't include cabotage or rights of establishment, but it is a lot more progressive than the old
bilateral 'horse trading' system.
The tantalising prospect of bringing all these separate arrangements together into a multilateral
agreement encompassing the nations of Europe and north America has become a topic for
credible discussion.
The pace for liberalisation is also quickening in central and south America. The US has initiated
open skies discussions on a bilateral basis with seven central American countries, with Panama
recently becoming the first country to initial such an agreement. Further south, the five Mercosur
nations have taken a significant if limited step towards open skies, tentatively agreeing to give
their airlines the right to launch third and fourth freedom services on routes not covered by
existing bilaterals.
Asia-Pacific - the current status
So where does all this leave the Asia-Pacific? As noted earlier, the liberalisation agenda has been
kick-started by the US. Already, it has clinched agreements with Singapore, Taiwan and Brunei,
and similar agreements are on the cards with Malaysia, South Korea and New Zealand.
There are similarities between the approach taken by the US in Asia and its earlier initiatives in
Europe. Within Asia-Pacific, as with Europe, there is already intense competition between
airports vying to be among the region's major hubs. In offering the potential for an increased
share of Asia-Pacific traffic, the US is holding out a tempting carrot to many Asian countries.
The first of the European open skies bilaterals, between the US and the Netherlands, was a huge
boost to Amsterdam's Schiphol's status as an international hub. This immediately put pressure on
the likes of F r d r t . It took some time, but ultimately even mighty Germany yielded and signed
a similar accord. Clearly, the US desires a similar d~minoeffect in the Asia-Pacific, with the goal
of mounting pressure on the region's heavyweight, Japan. More about Japan later.
But there is also a significant difference between Asia-Pacific and the European experience.
Compared with Europe, Asia is much more fragmented politically, economically and even
culturally. Asia is currently a long way from having any equivalent of the European Union.
Although the US initiatives in Europe have been undertaken on a country-by-country basis, there
is little doubt that the closer affinity felt between European nations - as evidenced by the single
aviation market - was a key contributor to their success across Europe. More about this later
too.

-

Other liberalisation initiatives within Asia-Pacific include agreement in principle for an open skies
pact between Singapore and New Zealand, and the deregulation of domestic aviation in countries
such as Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the case of Australia and New
Zealand, this has extended into a single aviation market at the domestic level. We have also seen
the emergence of new, privately-owned Asian carriers which are competing against the
established state-owned airlines, coupled with the privatisation of some national flag carriers.
But these pockets of progress cannot hide the fact that, overall, Asia-Pacific lags behind the US
and Europe in approach, pace and commitment to deregulation. By the same token, most Asian
airlines are not nearly as prepared as their U.S. or European counterparts to cope with the
pressures of deregulation.

.

The prevailing attitude of many Asian governments appears to be that, since their carriers are
benefiting fiom the inherent growth in the sector and have been performing relatively well, the
regulatory status quo will suffice. There is no long term view. All that needs to be done is to
expand capacity in the traditional manner through bilateral negotiations - which are now required
almost annually in many markets.
This complacency is also evident at the airline level. Many western airlines have emerged fkom
the past few years of recession, restructuring and deregulation as far leaner, more efficient and
more aggressive competitors. Asian carriers, by contrast, face rising costs - particularly for
labour - falling yields and lower profitability. somewhat ironically, aviation is now one of the
few industry sectors in which many Asians are beginning to fear the Americans and the
Europeans, rather than the other way round.
The Benefits of Liberalisation
In countries where the aviation market has been liberalised, consumers have benefited from
increases in service fiequency and quality, reduced prices and greater choice. Airlines themselves
have also benefited fiom significant increases in trffic volumes. It's no coincidence that those
airlines which have accepted liberalisation and embraced competition head-on are now among the
world's most successfbl and profitable. Others which have been much slower to embrace market
disciplines and have clung to government subsidies and protection, rank among the world's worst
performing.
Growth forecasts for the Asia-Pacific region underscore the importance of moving towards a
more liberalised regulatory regime for aviation. With growth rates outpacing those of most other
regions, the International Air Transport Association predicts that Asia-Pacific will become the
world's largest aviation market by 2010 -- accounting for slightly more than half of all global
traffic.
This growth is being underpinned by economic development across the region, particularly in
emerging markets. Research has indicated that as a country's per-capita Gross National Product
rises to about US$5000, the amount of air travel rises dramatically. Yet Asia's big three, China,

India and Indonesia - among the world's four most populous countries -- are all still well below
this threshold.
As Asian living standards rise, travel and tourism throughout the region is expected to continue to
boom. Already the performance is impressive - in 1997, the World Travel & Tourism Council
predicts that Asia-Pacific travel and tourism will generate gross output of close to one trillion US
dollars (US$969 billion) and provide employment for 175 million people.
Few industries are quicker or more effective than travel and tourism at creating jobs, earning
foreign exchange and stimulating economic activity. It creates the infiastructural fscilities, such
as hotels, transport, communications and financial services, which are essential to support general
trade and industrial growth. These infrastructure projects in turn inject new demand and attract
private sector investment. The industry also creates many small and medium-sized businesses,
nurturing entrepreneurial drive. According to the WTTC, this economic multiplier effect of travel
and tourism generates up to two and a halftimes the industry's direct output.
The linkage between aviation liberalisation and economic growth is clear. Increased competition,
through more choice, better service and lower fares, encourages more people to travel, more
often.
The potential for aviation liberalisation to contribute to world economic growth was recognised in
a major report into air transport policy published in February this year by the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development. The report recommended further liberalisation and a
more business-oriented approach to aviation policy -the first time that that the OECD has taken a
policy stance on such matters. The report was also notable for another first, with Japan becoming
the only member country to ever publicly dissent from an OECD report.
Shortcornin~sof the US O ~ e nSkies Initiative
So internationally, the forces in favour of aviation liberalisation are growing. But within AsiaPacific, how do we make significant progress from here? In seeking an answer to this question,
let's start by taking a closer look at the current US open skies initiative within the region.
The American effort certainly represents an improvement on the status quo. Someone had to
seize the initiative, and it had to be a big player with the necessary clout to get things moving.
But let's not be under any illusions as to why the US is making all the running on a bilateral
approach to open skies. Quite simply, a bilateral approach will always favour the strongest party
- which puts them in a truly formidable position.
The US can use its market clout to negotiate open-skies agreements, including fifth freedom
rights, with a handfbl of much smaller Asian countries. As the only common element in this group
of bilaterals, it stands to reap a huge advantage of each of its Asian bilateral partners. US airlines
will be able to fly freely between these Asian countries. The only way to restore a level playing
field will be for the Asian countries to negotiate similarly-liberal bilateral agreements between one

another - in other words, replicate the effect of a single multilateral accord involving all these
Asian countries.

The Need for Greater Regional Co-operation
Setting aside the US issue, it would also be in the interests of Asian countries to develop stronger
aviation links among themselves, to encourage increased travel and economic development at a
regional level.
Another powerfbl reason for greater co-operation between Asian countries, and their airlines, is
the need to improve their ability to withstand the growing threat faced fiom Western carriers. As
mentioned earlier, many Western airlines are now more efficient and aggressive competitors than
their Asian counterparts; this commercial advantage has been compounded by the formation of
mega-alliances. The most far-reaching alliances in global aviation are those between major
carriers in the US and Europe, such as UnitedILufthansa, Northwest/KI,M, Delta~SwissairISabena
and the proposed BAIAmerican tie-up. Within Europe, there are also various forms of alliance,
often involving equity stakes, to exploit the Singie Market. In Asia-Pacific, there are few
examples of alliances of equivalent scope or size, and regional strategic alliances are virtually
unknown.

In Europe and North America, there has been a strong correlation between the liberalisation of
aviation policies and establishment of alliances between airlines. Increased competition, through
liberalisation, and greater co-operation, through alliances, are necessary if Asian airlines are to
prosper, and Asian consumers and economies are to benefit in the long term.
The most effective path to open skies on a comprehensive basis throughout Asia will require a
more collective effort by governments. In short, Asia-Pacific needs to develop its own regional
open skies bloc, similar to that developed in Europe.
Let's be under no illusions of the challenges faced in getting Asian nations to think as one on this
issue. However, Asian nations are increasingly showing a willingness to work more closely
together. And as growth rates in the region moderate as economies begin to mature,
governments will be required to look harder at sectors such as aviation to extract their maximum
economic potential.
The Development of Regional Blocs
As noted earlier, there is currently no Asia-Pacific body comparable to the European Union.
About the closest grouping would be the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, APEC,
which is committed to fostering economic growth throughout the region.
Indeed, Australia's Transport Minister John Sharp has already advocated that the air cargo sector
be liberalised under the auspices of APEC. Many countries seem more comfortable about
considering liberalisation of cargo than passenger transport. Perhaps this is .because the
correlation between increased air cargo competition and economic growth is more apparent:
greater competition means more capacity, lower prices and a strong focus by carriers on
providing value-added services.

But it must be recognised that APEC is a quite loose confederation, with a diverse membership.
It may be difficult to develop a united position on aviation liberalisation overnight. It may be
more feasible, therefore, to start the process through the formation of mini blocs.
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) would be a logical place to start. It is
currently the strongest and most cohesive forum of any involving Asian countries. ASEAN open
skies would probably evolve fiom bilateral agreements between members, which would eventually
coalesce into a multilateral accord within the grouping. This might then be extended to include
Australia and New Zealand, which have already achieved a lot between themselves. Some of the
countries in North Asia might be another logical mini-bloc.

In the absence of any such initiative at the moment, Singapore is doing what it can to achieve
more liberal agreements with its Asia-Pacific counterparts. As well as the New Zealand open
skies accord mentioned earlier, Singapore has significantly expanded air links with Australia.
Other international forums, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)may also have an
important role to play. The past efforts of the WTO, and its GATT predecessor, to liberalise
trade in services have included air transport, albeit with the focus being on so-called "soft" rights
only. With the groundswell for liberalisation growing around the world, "hard" rights - including
air traffic rights - might still be pushed up the WTO agenda. There is no reason why the
principles and disciplines of the WTO cannot apply to aviation.
The Involvement of Japan
But regardless of which groupings are used to drive the process, substantive open skies in AsiaPacific can only occur with the involvement of Japan. Unfortunately, as evidenced by their
negative reaction to the recent OECD report, Japanese Transportation Ministry officials appear to
continue to devote their energies to interpreting a historical document drawn up 40 years ago the USIJapan bilateral.
Few people doubt that this agreement is lop-sided in favour of a fortunate few US airlines. But
trying to fix or 'reinterpret' the agreement is missing the real opportunity - to look afiesh at what
sort of regulatory environment would benefit Japan as a whole into the 21" century. Japan could
perhaps benefit from examining how Germany, with a somewhat similar outlook when it comes to
aviation, previously became converted to open skies.
There are a number of powerfbl reasons why Japan should support aviation liberalisation.
Efficient international aviation is vital to an economy that is export-led and that has substantial
investment interests abroad. A nation that travels extensively also needs an efficient and marketdriven aviation industry, while at a domestic level the very geography of Japan demands an
efficient aviation system. Finally, liberalisation would benefit Japanese airlines and encourage
them to become more internationally competitive.
This is not to suggest that Japan needs to immediately drop all restrictions. However, the longer
the status quo is maintained, the longer the Japanese economy and consumers will be made to

pay, and the more difficult it will become for the high-cbst Japanese airlines to adjust to the
competitive world. Japan should also look to play a leadership role within Asia-Pacific and be at
the forefront of the development of a regional open skies bloc. In doing so, its abiity - and that
of its neighbours - to negotiate with Europe or north America would be greatly enhanced.
Let's hope that, for the fbture success of Asian aviation, the bureaucrats in Tokyo can be
persuaded that open skies is in the best interest of their compatriots as well as the neighbours
throughout the region.
Conclusion
To summarize:
Rapid air traffic growth in Asia-Pacific has served to obscure the fact that the region lags
behind the West in terms of aviation liberalisation.
Although the recent US initiative to introduce open skies on a bilateral basis with some
countries is to be congratulated, it contains some inherent shortcomings and should only be
seen as a first step in a much broader liberalisation process.
The countries and airlines that will benefit most from the Asia-Pacific travel boom will be
those which embrace the principles of liberalisation and competition. Established regional
forums such as APEC and ASEAN have an important role to play in bringing about regulatory
reform throughout the region.
It is in all our interests - governments, airlines, consumers - to fiee aviation fiom its
regulatory shackles, make our airlines more efficient and competitive, and unleash the full
economic potential of this important industry.
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INITIATIVES FOR LIBERALIZING ASIA-PACIFIC
AVIATION : "WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE"

INTRODUCTION
Good afiernoon. It is indeed an honour to be here and to be included in the distinguished
group of panelists, moderators and guests to discuss and exchange views on the initiatives
taken to liberalize the aviation industry in the Asia Pacific region. The aviation industry as a
whole has gone through some turbulent times and is now beginning to show results of
extensive belt tightening measures and i,movative re-engineering that has enabled the
industry to emerge stronger and better prepared for the future.

BACKGROUND
International air transport is a vibrant, high technology and capital intensive industry which
has grown and expanded rapidly for the past fifty over years within a well defined legal,
economic, regulatory and institutional framework set down in the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (the Chicago Convention). Air transport relations between
States are basically governed by the approximately three thousand bilateral air transport
agreements signed between States. This bilateral system of air services agreements have
served reasonably well in facilitating growth and liberalization of international air services.
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However, the regulatory and operating environment has been challenged in recent years by
many changing trends and forces both external and internal to the industry.

The conclusion in December 1993, of the Uruguay Round on trade negotiations and the
adoption of the General Agreement on Trade in services has had a significant bearing on air
transport in particular increasing competition, globalization of the world economy,
privatisation and liberalization of services industries. This has led to many aviation experts
questioning the effectiveness of the traditional bilateral tools for regulatory market access,
capacity, pricing and dispute resolution and also their responsiveness and suitability in
providing for the most efficient and economic development of air transport in a global world
economy.

Against this background, ICAO organised the Air Transport Conference from 23
November

-

06 December 1994 to provide the aviation community with a unique,

appropriate and timely opportunity to review the regulatory fundamentals and to consider a
set of ideas for possible future arrangements emanating from the aviation perspective that
will enable the industry to adjust to the more open competitive and dynamic global operating
environment.

However, as we now all know this Conference failed to achieve its objective in propagating
"Multilateralism" as the way forward for the growth and expansion of the airline industry.
..3/-
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This was mainly due to the differing views and objectives amongst the participating States as
well as a certain degree of apprehension and understanding within the aviation industry.

The Asia Pacific aviation industry today is once again engulfed by the liberalization issue.
This is partly due to the liberalization within the European Community as well as the signing
of the "Open Skies" Agreements between the US and several European and Asian
countries. Other contributing factors are the privatisation of airlines and the possible
emergence of mega carrier alliances, development and growth of tourism industry and the
desire to establish "hubs" within the region by individual countries.

GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES IN ASIA PACIFIC
The focus of the aviation industry would now seem to be centred on the Asia Pacific region.
Growth in the Asia-Pacific region in the 1990's has compared favourably with that in Western
Europe and is expected to out perform the rest of the world. The Asia Pacific region is now
regarded as the dynamo of international air aviation industry and has become the focus of
growth and a catalyst for growth beyond its own boundaries. Air transport has emerged as a
significant mode of transportation, offering a competitive and viable alternative to other
established modes of transport. It has also grown in importance in terms of GNP contribution
and foreign earnings for most Asia Pacific c0untries.A report by ICAO, Asia Pacific Traffic
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Forecasting Group projects the top 40 city pairs within the region could show traffic

increases in aggregate terms at an average annual growth rate of 8.4% up to 1999, resulting
in passenger traffic increasing fiom 34.5 million to 60.7 million. IATA also expects total air
traffic to and fiom the region to reach by 2000 or 41.2% of the total global scheduled traffic.
Asia-Pacific airlines are also projected to carry 39% of the total global air passenger traffic at
the end of the century and 5 1% in 2010. Factors contributing to the buoyant growth are the
region's strong economic performances, political stability and opening of new markets. The
aggressive promotions and successful implementation of tourism programmes by countries in
the region are responsible for Asia Pacific registering the fastest growth market for air traffic.

LIBERALIZATION IN ASIA PACIFIC AVIATION INDUSTRY
Given the above scenario for growth opportunities within the Asia Pacific region, it can only
be expected that Governments within the region would actively pursue the issue of
liberalization of air services. However, in reality, as in the past, countries within the Air
Pacific region have generally been cautious and restrictive in terms of liberalization. Their
philosophy has basically been one of "incremental increases" based on growth and market
demand justification. This method have not gone down well with some carriers (particularly
privatised carriers) looking forward to expansion of air services within the region. However,
on a positive note this has to a certain extent ensured an orderly development of capacity
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tailored to meet traffic demand in the region. This could possibly be one of the reasons for
the success and profitability of most Asia Pacific carriers. Therefore, liberalization initiatives
within the Asia Pacific region would be basically driven by the competitive self interest of
carriers (especially privatised carriers) and the economic interest of the countries within the
region.

As we are filly aware that national aviation policy is the perogative of the

governments but in reality carriers do have a significant influence on the development of air
policy.

It is expected the competitive self interest of privatised carriers will influence government
policy and initiatives to seek for further liberalisation within the Asia Pacific region. This
will enhance their competitive positioning as well as to take advantage of the opportunities
available under a liberalized regime e.g. code-sharing alliances and greater market access.
The existing restrictive bilateral arrangements do not augur well for privatised carriers. It acts
as a hindrance to their growth potential and market accessibility.

The second factor for liberalization would be the economic interest of countries within the
Asia Pacific region. The rapid growth and development of the economies within the
Asia-Pacific region would spur Governments to seek for further liberalization within the
aviation industry to boost tourism and economic activity. National interests would to a
certain extent dictate the pace at which liberalization would be pursued at the expense of the
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interests of national carriers who continue to seek protection and safeguards against
competition from their Governments.

Therefore, it can be assumed that liberalization of the aviation industry by the Asia-Pacific
region is inevitable except that it may be at a slower pace as compared to liberalization within
the European Community and US. In summary, initiatives for liberalization within the
Asia-Pacific region would also be dependent upon numerous factors as follows:

(i)

ECONOMIC/POLITICAL/LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
Countries within the Asia-Pacific region particularly Asian countries differ
significantly in terms of economic, political and legal developments.

This is

somewhat different from the European countries who have a more or less
homogenous economic, political and legal environments. Importance of air services
increases proportionately with economic and political development as evident in the
Asia-Pacific region. Thus, we have a wide gap between countries seeking rapid
liberalization e.g. Singapore and those wanting to preserve the existing bilateral
systems. e.g Vietnam. Moreover, the fear of being swarmed by mega carriers from
North America and Europe, may also drive some Asian countries to put up barriers for
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protection. However, on the whole, gradual liberalization based on a phased in time
frame may be the key to liberalization of the aviation industry in the Asia-Pacific
region. This may help allay the fears of Asia-Pacific carriers (particularly national
carriers) and allow them to strengthen themselves to face competition under a
liberalised environment.

INFRASTRUCTUML DEVELOPMENT

(ii)

The level of infrastuctural development could be another important factor. At the
moment, most airports in Asia are facing congestion and infrastructural problems.
The opening up of new airports and the desire of the Governments to create major
,

hubs in the region could have a significant bearing on the pace of liberalization in the
region. Air corridors into and within Asia-Pacific are congested, a problem which
won't be solved until Future Air Navigation System (FANS) is a widespread
operational reality. However, the Governments desire to promote tourism growth
within the Asia Pacific region coupled with the opening of new airports will dictate
the pace of liberalization. Most Governments in the region will consider the total
economic impact of new airports in terms of employment, financial and investment
benefits.
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(iii)

NATIONAL OR PRIVATISED CARRIERS
It is also expected that countries with privatised carriers may be more inclined
towards liberalization of air services than those countries with state owned carriers.
State owned carriers may continue to seek for protection to maintain their share of the
market.

Countries whose carriers are ill prepared and incapable to withstand

competition may be relunctant to pursue liberalization.

On the other hand, emerging and ambitious secondary carriers could bring upon
'

pressure on their Governments to move towards liberalization. The allocation of
traffic rights has always been a tricky and difficult decision for Governments which
have more than one carrier.

(iv)

REGIONAL PACTS
Some countries may prefer that their own bilateral and regional pacts be strengthened
before moving towards, full liberalization. Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have
signed a somewhat limited "Open Skies" deal as a part of a package to liberalize trade
and services in the Growth Triangle area.

Another example is the Brunei,

-

Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines (BIMP) East Asia Growth Area regional
pact. This could possibly provide a model for a broader intra Asian pact in the future
e.g. an ASEAN "Open Skies" regime.
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Overall regional cooperation and global attempts to further fiee trade will gradually
pave the way for liberalization of the air services sector. However, this process has to
be actively pursued by the respective Governments within the region in the interests
of the nation and economic development of the region. National carrier interests may
be sacrificed to a certain extent in the process.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it can be said that initiatives for liberalization of the aviation industry in the
Asia Pacific region will gain further momentum in the near future. However, the degree and
the pace of liberalization within the Asia Pacific region would somewhat be dictated by the
above factors. In this regard, the role of individual Governments and their vision and desire
for liberalization will be a significant factor. The individual governments and the desire of
the privatised carriers for growth and expansion
liberalization in the Asia Pacific region.

will practically dictate the pace of
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1.0 INTRODUCTION:
The trend toward globalization of the airline industry has accelerated in recent
years as certain U. S. and foreign carriers have formed marketing alliances. Certain
foreign carriers have made substantial investments in U. S. carriers, which have
frequently been tied to marketing alliances, or, less frequently, reciprocal investments by
the U. S. carrier in its foreign partner. Foreign investment in U. S. air carriers is restricted
by statute and may be subject to review by the U. S. Department of Transportation
("'DOT") and, on antitrust grounds, by the U. S. Department of Justice ('DOJ").
On January 21,1993, British Airways and USAir announced that they have agreed
terms for a new alliance between the two airlines. The first stage of the transaction
included an initial equity investment by British Airways of $300 million in USAir Group
preferred stock and the signing of a flight code sharing agreement. This stage provided
the foundation for achieving USAir goal of improved liquidity during 1993.
In April 1993, in conjunction with USAir's proposed sale of million shares of
common stock, British Airways announced that it will exercise its right under the
investment agreement of January 2 1, 1993 to purchase additional preferred stock in
USAir to maintain its 24.6% holding in USAir Group's equity share capital on an
undiluted basis. In May 1993, British Airways also invested an additional $100.7 million
in exchange for USAir convertible preferred stock. ,
British Airways nominated three of the sixteen directors of USAir and,
accordingly, Sir Colin Marshal (Chairman), Derek Stevens (Chief Financial Officer), and
Roger Maynard (Director of Corporate Strategy) have joined the USAir Board of
Directors.

2.0 AIR CARRIER BACKGROUND:
British Airways (BA) is the world's largest scheduled international airline. Based
at London's Heathrow, the busiest airport in the world for international flights. BA
serves 165 destinations in 75 countries and carries 30 million passengers and 600,000
metric tons of cargo a'year. About 113 of the company's revenues and ?4 of its operating
income result from service to the Americas. BA has worked hard at upgrading its
services, and through layoffs and restructuring has transformed itself from a bloated,
second-rate airline into the world's most profitable airline. The carrier has a 24.6% stake
in both USAir and Australian Qantas Airlines and stake in many other domestic and
international airlines.
USAir Group is a holding company for USAir, the fifth largest U. S. airline.
Operating more than 400 aircraft, the company has hubs in BaltimoreIWashington,DC;
Charlotte, North Carolina; Philadelphia; and Pittsburgh, and overseas destinations in
countries such as Bahamas, Canada, France, and Germany. USAir Group also owns

Allegheny Airlines and other aviation subsidiaries. The company's plans to end years of
loses (stemming largely from price wars) included cutting annual costs by over $1 billion,
reducing under-performing flights, and seeking a merger.

3.0 RATIONALE OF MERGERS:
To enhance their profits, many businesses grow, which is often closely aligned
with sales, operating capacity, and competition, among other factors. Most corporate
growth occurs through internal expansion, which take place when the firm's existing
divisions grow through normal capital budgeting activities. However, the most dramatic
examples of growth, and often the largest increase in firms' stock prices, is the result of
mergers1. Mergers are the quickest way to grow and the most popular avenue to
diversification. Mergers are highly visible, lumpy investment decisions, whose effects to
company size, profitability, and employment has to be determined.

In most mergers, there are more or less clearly identified sellers and buyers. The
simplest explanation must be that both buyers and sellers consider themselves to be better
off from the merger transaction than without it. The primary motivation for most mergers
is to increase the value of the combined enterprise, wealth increasing of share holders,
and opportunities for improved operations.
If company A and B merged to form company C, and if company C's value
exceeds that of A and B taken separately, then synergy is said to exist2. Such a merger
should be beneficial to both A's and B's stockholders. Synergistic effects can arise from
four sources: (1) operating economies, which result from economies of scale in
management, marketing, production, or distribution; (2) financial economies, including
lower transaction costs and better financial analysts and media coverage; (3) differential
efficiency, which implies that the management of one firm is inefficient, and that the
firm's assets will be more productive after the merger; (4) eliminate access capacity; and
(5) probably, a short run effect, increased market power due to reduced competition.
Operating and financial economies are socially desirable, as are mergers that
increase managerial efficiency and lift profits to normal level, but mergers that reduce
competition and lead to monopoly profit level are both undesirable and illegal.
Also, mergers can provide an outlet for access cash. If a firm has a shortage of
internal investment opportunities compared to its cash flow, it could pay an extra
dividend, invest in marketable securities, repurchase its own stocks, repay outstanding
bank credit and account receivable facility, or purchase another firm.

'

Merger means any combination that forms any economic unit from two or more previous ones. For legal
purposes, there are distinctions among the various ways these combinations can occur.
If synergy exists, then the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Synergy is also called the
"2 + 2 = 5 effect."

In the case of the airline industry, mergers can bring among other incentives: (1)
economies of traffic density; (2) preference of customers for large airlines; and (3) if the
merger occurred at one hub, their may be limited opportunity for new carrier to enter the
market because of gates and landing slots dominance and control.
European airlines are focusing on joint business arrangements (mergers) as a
means for gaining strength and matching new competition from carriers based in the U. S.
and other areas of the world. USAirBritish Airways merger is directed toward the
formation of a multinational holding company to oversee what would be two independent
airline subsidies, and diversity partnerships. Some advantages arising form the
development of a cross-border giant airline would be in purchasing power and in
controlling passenger traffic and cargo movement over key routes.
4.0 CONSEQUENCES OF AIRLINE MERGERS:
There are a number of likely consequences of airline mergers. In the short run:
1. Increased equipment;
2. Opportunity to establish market identity;
3. Immediate access to more markets.

The consequences in the long run are:
1. Entry barriers;
2. A monopoly on some routes;
3. Coordination of behavior to lessen competition;
4. Reduced disparity with other competitors;
5. Betterlworse carrier finance;
6. The release of airplanes for other uses or liquidation of equipment;
7. Increaseldecrease in employment;
8. Better domestic and/or international route structure;
9. Domestic industry concentration.
Airline mergers do not conclude all the mentioned consequences. It all depends
on the size, market, geographic location, and the financial'capital resources the merged
airline have.
In analyzing the consequences after the merger, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
isolate and distinguish the affects of the merger from the affects of the many forces such
as the state of the economy, interest rate, fuel prices, and any major strike, which would
influence the airline's behavior.

5.0 BRITISH AIRWAYS/USAir MERGER:
From British Airways point of view, the investments in USAir give the airline
strategic alliance and a stronger presence in the major market of North America. In
particular British Airways saw additional revenues from the 54 routes in the United States
on which code-sharing agreement was in place.
The results of British Airways for the year of 1994 reflect early cost and revenue
benefits from the global alliance. The majority of the benefits had come from the alliance
with USAir, where work on achieving benefits from the transatlantic partnership was well
advanced. Cost savings had been achieved in many areas includingjoint purchasing
initiatives and engineering best practice.
Revenue benefits, which made up the major parts of the benefits, had principally
been generated by linking the British Airways and USAir route networks through code
sharing, joint frequent flyer programs and coordination of the airlines' sales efforts.
From USAir point of view, the alliance initial equity investment by British
Airways provided the foundation for achieving the airline goal of improved liquidity
during 1993. At the same time, British Airways commitment to the alliance with USAir,
including code-share services and joint-programs for increasing operating efficiencies and
revenues.
Through the combined route structures, USAir customers had improved access to
339 destinations in 71 countries. Code sharing between USAir and British Airways,
initiated in 1993, offered customers the benefits of seamless travel- including one-stop
ticketing and baggage check-in -to London and points beyond.
On the revenue side, the code sharing arrangement with British Airways provided
a more attractive, seamless international product for USAir customers traveling to
London and beyond. Reciprocal and redemption of mileage for USAir frequent travelers,
along with the ability to combine mileage earned in the two programs, has spurred a twofold increase for both airlines in frequent travelers flying each other's routes.
On the cost side, USAir realized savings through coordinated efforts in the areas
of purchasing, aircraft maintenance, and cargo services.
Routes to London formally operated by USAir continued to be operated by British
Airways under a "wet lease" agreement, through which British Airways leased three
B767 aircraft from USAir, including cockpit and cabin crews, for service to London from
Pittsburgh, BaltimoreIWashington and Charlotte.
Both airlines also continued their joint program of reciprocal mileage earning and
redemption for both USAir and British Airways' frequent travelers, which ended March
1997. Members of USAir's Frequent Traveler Program (FI'P) received mileage credit for

any British Airways flights taken world wide and can request FTP awards to nearly 1'14
destinations in the British Airways' system.

5.1 Traffic and Financial Analysis:
5.1.1 Traffic and Operating Review:
Traffic between 1990 and 1993 for the airlines was weak in general and USAir in
particular. There were two developments in 1990. First, the Middle East war which
stood at the top of the list. The damage was done in the first quarter, when the Gulf War
was accompanied by media inspired fear of terrorist attacks on commercial aircraft. No
such attack occurred. Also, USAir had cut West Coast operations and a planned 6%
growth in capacity for 1991 was reduced to what was essentially a "no growth" plan for
the year, as can be seen in Table (1).
Second, was the death of many airlines. The year 1991 was the great extension.
Three U. S. airlines closed their doors (Eastern, Midway, and Pan American), and two of
them, Eastern and Pan American, go back to the earliest days of commercial aviation. In
terms of traffic trends, the significance is that the closing of these airlines had almost no
effect on the results. In the context of day-to-day operations they passed almost without
notice.
The year of the merger (1993) had a positive impact on British Airways and
USAir traffic. British Airways benefited the most despite of IATA member airlines weak
international traffic and services in 1993, as can be seen in Table (1). In 1994-1995,
USAir had been severely affected by increasing competition from low-cost, low-fare
airlines in its principal geographic market area in the northeast of the United States.
In 1995 and 1996 British Airways passenger traffic (RPK) increased by 6.7% and
9.8% respectively while capacity (ASK) increased 4.4% and 6.7% respectively, resulting
in a record passenger load factor for both years of 7 1.6% and 73.6% respectively, as can
be seen in Tables (I), (2), and (3). The results reflect the continued strong performance in
customer service standards, creating demand for passenger services on a capacity growth,
which produced record seat and overall load factors.
USAir passenger traffic (RPM) for 1995 decreased by 0.9% while capacity (ASM)
had decreased by 4.7% resulting in passenger load factor of 64.7%. USAir's 1996
available seat mile, or capacity, was down 2.2%, while revenue passenger miles increased
by 4.3% resulting in a record load factor of 68.5%, as can be seen in Tables (I), (2), and
(3). These results were USAir efforts to maximize revenues and yields in its core
domestic markets through capacity "rightsizing" and operational refinements. Many of
USAir's unprofitable flights had been eliminated.

Table (1)

Table (2)

British AitwayslUSAir Load Factor Comparison 1990-1996
Year

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

British Airways
Break-even LF
Load Factor

71.50%
70.10
70.20
70.80
70.00
71.60
73.60

63.30%
64.80
61.20
62.80
61.30
61.50
62.90

Table (3)

Load Factor

USAir
Break-even LF

59.80%
58.60
58.80
59.20
62.20
64.70
68.50

64.50%
62.70
63.20
61.70
67.30
64.90
67.90

5.I .2 Employee Productivity:
A critical issue regarding the merger of British Airways and USAir was the
integration of the two carriers without major disruptions. Experience with airline mergers
suggests that "Murphy's Law" occur more often than not. To address this issue, Table (4)
following the text explore a productivity indicator for both carriers. Industry productivity
has risen reflecting an essentially flat employee head count between 1990 and 1993 while
overall capacity has grown. British Airways and USAir experienced rising
RPWEmployee and RPMEmployee respectively.
British Airways was, and still is committed to recognizing the contribution to its
success by its well-motivated and dedicated employees, and to fully involve them in
making decisions. USAir has a dedicated, committed and able group of employees.
Pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, ramp workers, customer service agents, and
operations control employees all play vital roles in the operation of the airline.

Table (4)

5.1.3 Financial Analysis:
Many different individuals and groups are interested in the success or failure of a
given business. The most important are owners (investors), managers, lenders and
creditors. An assessment of the long term financial health of a company is an important
task for outsiders considering the extension of credit or an investment and for insiders in
their formulation of strategy.
One measure of the profitability of a business is its net profit margin (NPM). This
information is necessary to determine a company's profit as a percentage of sales, which
can be found in the company's income statement.
British Airways net profit margin had been fluctuating between 1.92 to 7.56 over
the period of this study. British Airways NPM increased by 2.61 reflecting strength in
scheduled service businesses partly offset by the reduction in non-scheduled services.

USAir's net profit margin had been in the negative territory between 1990 and
1994. After five years of large and disappointing loses, USAir net profit margin (1995
and 1996 NPM of 1.60 and 2.38 respectively) was a refreshing and well-earned change
from the previous years, as can be seen in Table (5).
This movement in profitability was the result of both improvements in the general
economy as well as actions on the part of British Airways and USAir.

Table (5)

Clearly the best-known liquidity measure is the current ratio, which examines the
relationship between current assets and current liabilities. Current ratio measures the
ability of the company to meet its financial obligations, as they become current. The
main orientations of the lenders of a company are of two folds. Lenders have an interest
in funding the needs of a successful business that will perform as expected. At the same
time, they must consider the possible negative consequences of default and liquidation.
From the lenders' point of view, the larger this ratio, the better the position of the
debt holder. In the case of British Airways, the current ratio had been improving with
best result was in 1994 of 1.22 and it is fairly good relative to the "typical" industry
current ratio. On the other hand, USAir's current ratio had deteriorated from 1990 to
1992 and had been showing improvement since the merger with British airways as can be
seen in Table (6).

Table (6)
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The use of borrowed funds supplied b)owners (investors) by profitable
companies will improve the return on equity, which is translated to earning per share
(EPS). However, it increases the risk of the business and, if used in excessive amounts,
can results in financial embarrassment.
British Airways profit for 1996 was a new record, which was up 17.8% over 1995
(before provision against investment in USAir). This record profit is reflected by 1996
EPS of $7.21. The result reflects continued focus on managing costs. Price/Earning ratio
(P/E) is used to indicate how the stock market is judging the company's earning
performance and prospects. British Airways P/E ratio has been very conservative in
comparison to the industry average.
For USAir, this ratio does not indicate or measure any thing between 1990 and
1994, because of the negativeness of EPS for that period. USAir recorded positive net
income for the years 1995 and 1996 compared to net loses in the previous years. USAir's
improvement in net income reflects a revenue increase coupled with a decrease in
operating expenses, as can be seen in Table (7).

Table (7)

British Airways stock price shown an impressive performance since 1990. The
maximum value for the stock between 1990 and 1996 was $102.75 and the minimum
value was $37.625, while the average value was $70.19~. On the other hand, USAir
stock price has dipped to $4.25 in 1994 from its maximum value of $33.25 in 1990. The
average stock price for USAir stock between 1990 and 1996 was $28.31.
One interpretation of the variance is that it measures the "expected surprises".
The surprise is not in the fact that expectation has not been realized, but rather in the
direction and the magnitude of deviation. British Airways variance for the period 19901996 was 1060.32 compared to USAir variance for the same period of 24.38.

British Airways and USAir stock prices are based on daily closing price from January 1990 till December
1996. The data was collected by the author.

Because the variance squares each deviation, the author computed standard
deviation, which is the square root of the variance. British Airways average stock price
for the period 1990-1996 was $70.19 and a standard deviation of 32.56%(which was
more volatile than any single period) compared to USAir average stock price of $28.31
and a standard deviation of 4.94%for the same period. Thus, during 1990-1996 USAir
stock price was lower on average and slightly less volatile, other factors considered
constant, than for British Airways. As a trend, British Airways stock price has been
climbing since 1990 on average compared to USAir stock price which been fluctuating
for the same period, as can be seen in Tables (8) and (9).

Table (8)

Table (9)

6.0 CONCLUSION:

'

British Airways/USAir merger had been a mutually beneficial relationship.
It allowed USAir access to British Airways' market, created tremendous synergy,
provided added value and convenience to customers, and extra cash that USAir
desperately needed to reduce costs and expand its global presence. In 1996, British
Airways expanded its network of code-sharing services with USAir in the United States
to 78 cities. Passengers transferring to British Airways from USAir had risen by 49% to
560 passenger a day.
On October 24, 1996, USAir said that it is ending a key marketing agreement with
British Airways effective Mar 29, 1997, in light of the British carrier's proposed alliance
with American Airlines. USAir also said that it has informed British Airways that the
link between the two airlines' frequent traveler programs will end on the same date.
Although the move was a surprise, it will have little impact on USAir, which received far
less revenue from the alliance that did British Airways.
The economic outlook is encouraging and industry results for the first three
months in 1997 continue to show improvements in both domestic and international
airlines' load factor. Industry financial performance remains positive, with IATA
forecasting increased profitability for 1997.
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Alliances: Stability and duration

A typology of strategic alliances in the airline industry: Propositions
for stability and duration

ABSTRACT

While strategic alliances have become commonplace in the airline industry, the
stability and performance of these alliances remains questionable. In this article, the
authors review the structure of recent alliances in the airline industry and propose a
typology of alliances based on two key dimensions: commitment of resources and
complexity of arrangement. Using this typology, the authors derive a series of
propositions on the stability and duration of vari~ustypes of alliances.
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A typology of strategic alliances in the airline industry: Propositions

for stability and duration

A 1996 survey by Airline Business reported 389 alliances in the global airline
industry, a 19 percent increase over 1995. These alliances range from simple code sharing
agreements to equity swaps, management agreements, and joint governance arrangements.
According to Airline Business, several trends emerged. First, there has been a decline in
alliances involving equity stakes. Only 16 percent of the current agreements involved
equity as compared to 18 percent of the prior year's alliances. Second, more airlines are
becoming involved in the alliance movement. In 1994, there were 136 airlines engaged in
some form of alliance. This increased to 153 in 1995 and 171 in 1996. Finally, many
airlines are in the process of restructuring their alliance network, dropping some alliances
and adding new ones. Iberia who reduced the number of its alliances from 27 last year to
13 was cited as typical of this trend, dropping alliances with a number of smaller carriers

and adding larger, more established partners.
The airline industry is not alone in its growing attraction to alliance arrangements.
According to Anderson (1990), more alliances have been announced since 1981 than in all
of the previous years combined. Since 1985 the annual rate of alliance formation has been
over 25 percent (Pekar & Allio, 1994). Problems of instability, poor performance, and
failure are also not limited to the airline industry (Business Week, 1986; Geringer &
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Herbert, 1991). Doorley (1993) found that 60 percent of the alliances he examined had a
survival rate of only four years. Less than 20 percent survived for ten years.
Porter (1990) has suggested that alliances are transitional rather than stable
arrangements and rarely result in a sustainable competitive advantage. Harnel(1991)
views them as a race to learn in which the winner will eventually establish dominance in
the "partnership".

In their article, Bleeke and Ernst (1995) class@ alliances into six

types, only one of which they suggest will last longer than the median life span of seven
years. The other types are destined to end in dissolution, acquisition or divestiture.
A growing body of research has begun to focus on the role of alliance structure

and scope in promoting stable relationships and improved performance (Dussauge &
Garrette, 1995; Osborn & Baughn, 1990; Parkhe, 1993). For this paper, we examined
the structure, scope, and resource commitment of a number of alliances within the airline
industry. Based on this study, we developed a typology of alliances from which we
derived a series of propositions on the stability and duration of these alliances.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Definitions
Strategic alliances are a distinct form of entry mode that have been used as a lowcost means of gaining access to new markets and local intiastructure (Doz, Prahalad, &
Hamel, 1990). They have been defined as "relatively enduring interfirm cooperative
arrangements, involving flows and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance
structures from autonomous organizations, for the joint accomplishment of individual
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goals" parkhe, 1991: 58 1). We have excluded mergers and acquisitions from
consideration since there would technically no longer be two "autonomous organizations".
This was not a major problem in the airline industry for two reasons. Fist, the industry is
highly concentrated already and mergers and acquisitions are relatively rare events.
Second, most national governments place severe restrictions on such activity.

In the joint venture literature, instability has been defined in terms of changing
control (equity), termination, and duration (Franko, 1971; Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1989).
From our perspective, a stable relationship is one in which there are no major changes in
the relationship. This would include changes designed to increase or decrease the linkages
between firms, however, it would not necessarily include the termination of the
relationship. As Inkpen and Beamish (1997) point out, a stable venture may terminate
when the strategic needs of one or both partners change. A termination that is "unplanned
and premature from the perspective of either one or both partners" (182), such as the
British Airways1USAir alliance, would be considered an indication of instability.

Dimensions of an Alliance
Bleeke and Ernst (1995) based their typology of alliances on the market strength
of partners, their motivation, and the outcome of the relationship. To this extent, it is a
post-facto typology since alliances can not be ultimately classified until the outcome of the
relationship is known. For example, an alliance between a weak firm and a strong fum can
result in either a Type III alliance in which the weaker partner fails to gain strength and is
acquired or divested or a Type IV alliance in which the weak partner increases its strength
to become an equal and dissolves the partnership since it can now survive on its own. Our
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goal was to identi@several characteristics or qualities that could be used to predict the
stability and duration of alliance arrangements.
A review of the reported alliance arrangements to date revealed two key
dimensions on which they diiered: commitment of resources and complexity of
arrangement. Figure 1 reports the classification of different alliance types by these two
dimensions.

-

Type I Codesharing.This was defined as a commercial agreement between two
airlines under which an airline operating a service allows another airline to offer that
service to the traveling public under its own night designator, even though it does not
operate the service (Burton & Hanlon, 1995). These agreements are point specific and
must be arranged for each city the airline wishes to serve. Beyhoff (1995) distinguishes
between five types of codesharing: free sale, wet lease, fianchise, blocked space, and joint
venture. Differences are related to which carrier is responsible for the risk involved and the
predetermined allocation of seats. We have included only the fiee sale type of codeshare
in this category. The benefit to this type of relationship is the ability to be route specific as
well as offering ccseamless"service to passengers. According to Humphreys (1994) the
main reason airlines historically entered codeshare arrangements was to benefit in terms of
CRS display since CRSs tend to place multiple displays on the first screen from which
seventy to ninety percent of all nights are booked (Hadrovic, 1990).
This type of alliance (fiee sale code share) is characterized by a low level of
required resources and a low level of commitment. Therefore, a codeshare agreement
needs less attention fiom either partner than other types of alliances. There are no real
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resources needed here for either partner because, once programmed, the computer
reservation system (CRS) will automatically show the flight with the carriers two letter
code anytime it is asked. Due to the low level of commitment and complexity, codeshare
agreements are the most widely entered into alliances and account for over 70% of all the
alliances in the industry today (Whitaker, 1995).
Type 11, Blocked Space Agreements, Revenue Sharing, "wet"lease, and
franchzsing. A blocked space agreement exists when one airline allocates to another a

number of seats on some of its flights: a kind of partial "wet lease". The other airline then
sells these seats to the traveling public through its own marketing and distribution system
(Burton & Hanlon, 1995). The responsibiity for selling these seats fall on the ccleashg"
airliney', as well as the losses incurred in the event that the seats are not sold.
In this case, there is a medium level of resource commitment because the airline

must provide the seats to the "leasing" airline. This, in effect, means that the airline
providing the seats has a better chance of meeting or exceeding break-even load factors
due to the fact that those seats "blocked out" to the leasing airline will be paid for whether
they are full or not. The "leasing" airline also has only a medium level of resource
commitment because it only requires the use of the CRS to display the available seats on
airline has a greater risk in
the flight. It is important to acknowledge that the "lea~ing'~
this case because it will be the one to lose revenue if it does not sell the available seats.
The complexity of the arrangement is low because there is not a great deal of coordination
that must take place.
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though such things as maintenance support and training may be required, the level of
interaction once the system is working is not substantial.
Type IV, Insurance and Parts Pooling. This type of alliance involves the joint
purchase of parts or insurance by two airlines. Such an alliance would occur to spread out
the high cost of insurance or to allow for a greater availability of parts. This type of
alliance may be beneficial to those airlines which share facilities (i.e. hangers, etc), have
similar route structures, or have small fleets.
This alliance consists of a low level of resource commitment. This is true for two
reasons. First, both airlines in the alliance would have to buy insurance and parts in any
event. Second, this agreement actually provides lower expenditures due to the sharing of
expenses. The level of complexity is moderated due to the mount of interaction which
might normally take place. Areas of coordination would include coordinating policies and
coverages and coordinating part ordering for different maintenance facilities. The amount
of interaction, although not high, may present a certain mount of diculty.
Type V, Joint Service. Airlines entering into joint service partnerships have
complementary route structures and are able to blend their flights. The partners are
striving to provide "seamless" service to as many destinations as possible. This type of
alliance is beneficial for airlines which have similar fleets as well as similar or
complementary routes. Joint service provides airlines the ability to cut costs through the
reduction of 'ground hours' (Gallacher, 1994). This type of alliance may also offer
flexibility to both partners.

AIliances: Stability and duration

Revenue sharing occurs when both airlines experience revenues that they would
not otherwise experience without the arrangement. In other words, the ability of an airline
to iill more seats through a joint venture codeshare, a blocked space agreement or a joint
marketing agreement brings in more revenue for the airline and, in turn, the airline
benefiting fiom the higher revenue will pass a portion of that revenue onto the other
carrier (Beyhoflil 1995; Burton & Hanlon, 1995). A "wet" lease occurs when one carrier
rents the aircraft and staff of another. In a hchising arrangement the operating airline
"rents" the brand name of another airline but supplies its own staff and aircraft (Beyhoff,
1995).

These alliance types were placed under a Type I1 classification because the amount
of interaction which takes place is generally low once the agreement has been reached. At
the same time, it requires a moderate level of resources, i.e. the use of CRS, the
surrendering of a block of seats fiom one partner to another, aircraft rental, etc.

Computer Reservation Systems (CRS). This arrangement is one in which
airlines share CRS. There are three major U.S. computer reservation systems, Sabre,
System One, and Apollo. For many airlines, it is easier to use another airline's system
than to support its own. An airline could even go so far as to purchase a certain share of
the reservation system from another airline.
The commitment of resources is high for this type of alliance. This is true because
one airline must purchaseuease the system fiom another. Conversion to and training in the
new system must take place. The airlie providing the system may also include
maintenance support. The interaction between partners is still low at this point. Even
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Both the commitment of resources and the complexity of the arrangement are
moderate. In a joint service agreement, there is a signtficant amount of coordination of
flights as well as the use of at least one partners aircraft.
Type VI, Management Contract. Airlines participating in this type of alliance
decide that their partnership would be better served if one group of trained individuals
were responsible for a portion of the alliance. This group can be made up of managers
fiom both airlines or can be a group from only one airline. Often this type of alliance is
entered into to ensure a constant level of service or to provide consistency in decision
making.
The level of resource commitment is high in this case due to the fact that either one
or both partners will be providing valuable employees to the alliance. The level of
interaction is moderate due in large part to the hands off approach of top level
management. The management group that will be working in conjunction with each
airline has a high level of interaction in daily operations.
Twe VLI, Baggage Handling, GroundMaintenance, and Facility Sharing. This
type of alliance is for airlines with similar routes who have the ability to work together in
providing baggage handling and ground maintenance so that the operations of both airlines
can run smoothly. The baggage handling agreement would be beneficial for any airline
which has passengers transferring from one airline to another, especially overseas.
Ground maintenance contracts can save an airline a great deal of time by having parts and
maintenance personnel available at non-hub maintenance facilities. Finally, facility sharing
can cut cost and provide each airline with needed gate availability or hanger space.
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Twe VIII, Joint marketing. In this type of alliance, airline are usually looking to
market their joint service. Airlines spend a great deal of money in marketing and
promotion of themselves, emphasiig in particular the size of their networks and their
connections with the networks of their partners (Burton & Hanlon, 1995).
The classification for this type is a moderate level of resource commitment and a
high level of interaction. The moderate level of resource commitment is due to the capital
that must be placed into the marketing campaign. There is a high level of interaction due
to the cooperation that must go into the preparation of the marketing program and the
trust required between competitors in an industry where marketing is often seen as a key
competitive advantage.
T v ~I
eX,Equity/Govemnce. Equity sharing or swapping is also used in airline
alliances. The exchange of a certain percentage of equity or the purchase of shares by one
partner accounted for 16 percent of the alliance agreements in the third annual alliance
survey by Airline Business (June 1996). These alliances also frequently involve the
participation of one or both airlines in the board governance structure of their partner
airline.
This type of alliance has both high resource commitment and complexity. The
purchase or exchange of shares represents substantial financial commitment while the level
of interaction in shared governance situation requires interaction at the highest, strategic
levels of the airline.
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Stability and Duration of Alliances
Resource commitment and complexity have been the subject of extensive research
and debate in a number of fields including entry mode strategy, organizational structure
and design, and strategic intent. Resource commitment involves dedicating assets to a
particular use in such a way that their redeployment to other uses would result in some
level of cost to the k.
It not only K i t s strategic flexibility and serves as a barrier to exit
but may result in sunk, unrecoverable costs to the firm (Harrigan, 1981). According to
Parkhe (1993), the willingness to commit resources to an alliance lessens the perception of
opportunistic behavior on the part of partners. A high degree of nonrecoverable, alliancespecific investment has been shown to create more stable, higher performing alliances
(Freeman, 1987; Heide & John, 1988; Smith & Aldrich, 1991). Based in this line of
reasoning, we would suggest that:

Proposition I : m e stability of an alliance will increase with the level of resource
commitment. m e most stable alliances will involve high levels of commitment by
all parties in the alliance.
Proposition 2: m e &ration of the alliance will be positively related to the level
of resource commitment.
Researchers have linked resource commitment (money, personnel, and time) to

firm control, involvement in operations, and responsibility for decision making (Anderson
& Gatignon, 1986; Root, 1987). Yet, the more complex the relationship the greater the

"fbndamental problem of cooperation" (Ouchi, 1980: 130). Alliances that involve greater
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coordination and integration of resources require a level of trust and interaction that is
generally foreign to competitive firms. Kogut (1988) found that joint ventures were more
unstable in highly concentrated industries, particularly when the fbnctional scope included
marketing and after-sales services. His finding is likely related to the "competitive" nature
of marketing-related issues. The need for higher levels of coordination and integration is
also likely to increase problems relating to incompatible systems, procedures, training, and
organizational cultures. For these reasons, we suggest that:
Proposition 3: As the complexity of the alliance increases, so will the likelihood
that it ,willexperience instability.
Proposition 4: The duration of the alliance will be negatively related to the
complexity of the alliance.
As our analysis of the current variation in alliance types (Figure 1) reveals, these

two dimensions do not necessarily vary in tandem. It is possible to have an alliance that
involves significant commitment of resources but low levels of complexity and visa versa.
The f i c u l t y in attempting to predict which type of alliance will be most stable or durable
stems from the fact that the pressures applied by these two dimensions are conflicting:
increasing resource commitment is expected to increase stability while increasing
complexity decreases it. However, we would suggest that taken as a whole a pattern does
emerge for both stability and duration.
A Type I alliance is characterized by low levels of both resource commitment and
complexity. Such an arrangement is likely to have a very specific, limited scope and
purpose. While this type of alliance may be terminated when the strategic focus of one or
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both parties changes, the fact that is requires relatively little attention and resources would
seem to make it a potentially stable arrangement. In fact, such as alliance may endure long
after its strategic purpose has ceased to apply simply due to organizational inertia or
inattention.

Proposition 5: A Type I alliance will exhibit a high level of stability due to
the limited nature of the arrangement.
On the other hand, a Type IX alliance consumes a high level of resources and
requires the partners to engage in complex interactions such as joint governance. Partners
in such an alliance would be expected to experience more problems related to integrating
systems, cultures, managerial and competitive philosophies. However, the high level of
resource commitment should increase the incentive of both partners to "make the alliance
work".

Proposition 6: A T s e IX alliance will exhibit high levels of instability as
partners seek to achieve a workable relationship
A Type III alliance involves a high level of resource commitment on the part of at

least one party to an alliance arrangement that does not involve a great deal of interaction
between the firms. This lack of interaction would tend to lessen the problems associated
with incompatible systems, cultures, etc. In this case, the overriding issue may be the
sizable cost of terminating the relationship. Therefore, we suggest that:

Proposition 7: Type III alliances will be the most durable type of alliance due
to the high level of resource commitment and low level of complexity
(interaction).
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Finally, a Type VII alliance requires a high level of interaction between partners
that is likely to reveal differences in training, supervisory approach, culture, etc. The fact
that this type of arrangement does not involve high levels of resource commitment would
make the decision to end the relationship less costly. Thus,
Proposition 8: A Type VII alliance is most likely to experiencefailure due to the
high level of complexity (interaction) and low level of resource commitment.

CONCLUSION
The term "strategic alliance" has been applied to a wide variety of interfirm
cooperative ventures. Within the airline industry the term has been used to describe
everything fiom a simple single route codesharing to the elaborate agreement proposed
between British Air and American. Given this level of diversity, it should not be surprising
that researchers and manager alike differ in their assessment of the stability, duration, and
performance of strategic alliances. In this paper we have suggested that alliances vary in
relationship to two dimensions, commitment of resources and complexity of arrangement.
In general, the higher the commitment of resources to the alliance the greater the stability

and the duration of the relationship. The more complex the arrangement the less stable
and the more likely the alliance is to end in failure. Taken together, these two
characteristics result in contradictory pressures on the alliance.
We have argued that the most stable type of alliance is one in which there is low
resource commitment and complexity because such a relationship usually has a very
narrow, specific purpose and does not consume valuable resources in an effort to integrate
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interfirm activities or cultures. The most durable alliance will involve high levels of
resource commitment to a relatively simple activity or arrangement. In this case, cost is
the most significant pressure on the alliance. Those types of alliances most likely to fail
are characterized by low levels of resource commitment, particularly nonrecoverable
resources, to activities involving a high degree of complexity, interaction, and integration.
Finally, alliances subject to the dual pressures of high cost and high interaction are more
likely to experience instability.
From our perspective, instability in and of itself is not necessarily a "bad thing." It
can be an indication that the parties in the alliance are committed to establishing a
suecessfbl partnership. Alliances have often been referred to as marriages. As such, we
would expect to see periods of conflict, change, and readjustment as the partners learn and
grow in their own right and in their knowledge of each other. It is possible that stability in
complex relationships is the exception rather than the norm and that expecting stability
only sets the relationsh* up for failure.
Further efforts should be undertaken to understand the elements that contribute to
ccsuccessll"alliances in order to help iirms achieve the theoretical benefits of this type of
market entry. It is hoped that this paper will provide a fiuithl basis for some of this
effort.
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The Effect of Strategic Alliance on Performance
A Study of the global Airline Industry
< Abstract >

This study investigates codesharing alliances to see if they increase market shares of the carriers involved by
analyzing a time-series data of fifty six airlines over the 1986-93 period. Our empirical results indicate: (a)
codesharing, in fact, increases the carriers' market shares; (b) codesharings between existing airlines increase
market shares less than those between relatively new camers; and (c) the market-share-increasing effect of
codesharing alliance is higher in markets with fewer competing carriers.

Introduction
As strategic alliances (SAs) within and across borders have attracted growing attention among
scholars as well as managers since 1980s, prolific academic efforts have built up various theoretical
perspectives on the dynamics of SA. One of the main academic efforts is the studies on the motives of
strategic alliances: sharing risks and costs, learning through alliances, getting access to financial and
technological resources, entering new markets, and creating new technology or venture projects (Berg,
Duncan, & Friedman, 1982; Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Friedrnan & Kalmanoff, 1961; GomesCasseres, 1993; Gulati, 1993; Hagedoorn & Schakenrad, 1990; Harrigan, 1988a; Hennert, 1991;
Kanter, 1988; Kogut, 1988; Mody, 1993; Parkhe, 1993; Pisano, 1990; Porter & Fuller, 1986; Shan,
1987; Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, only a few studies analyze the effects of SAs on performance
of allied firms (Beamish, 1984; Blodgett, 1992; Franko, 1971; Geringer & Hebert, 1989 ;Hamel, 1991;
Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1989; Parkhe, 1991, 1993; Porter & Fuller,1986; Schaan & Beamish, 1988).
Even though these studies about the effects of SAs on performance have contributed to
theoretical development, they have some limitations in explaining the dynamics of SA. First, to analyze
the performance of SAs, they use proxy variables such as stability, duration of alliances, survival ratio,
or perceptual satisfaction of managers. However, these proxy measures of performance may not
properly reflect the real performance of SAs. For example, if the objective of an alliance was learning a
specific skiU as soon as possible, then a shorter duration could represent better performance. Perceptual
satisfaction of managers can also create respondent bias. If a responding manager is a person who has
highly involved in the alliance project, or has a strong cornrnitment to the alliance, he or she may tend to
answer more positively than otherwise. Second, the samples used in these studies included various kinds

of alliances in multiple industries. The bias resulting from differences in the nature of alliances and
various industries may blur the effects of alliances on performance. Finally, previous studies measured
only the performance of SAs themselves, mainly joint ventures, not the effect of SAs on the allied firms'
peformance. That is, they measured the performance of joint ventures in terms of stability, durability, or
perceptual satisfaction. With a few exceptions (Mitchell & Singh, 1996), they did not measure how
much SAs can improve the current perfarmance of the allied firms.
As the number of non-equity alliances such as co-development of new products, co-promotion,
cross licensing of technology, and co-purchasing has increased due to intensified competition, "what
effects do SAs have on performance of the allied firms?'has become one of the most important, yet
difficult questions. The difficulty of this research question is obvious by the following facts. First, hrms
may be reluctant to release confidential performance data, which can be critical in analyzing the effect of
SAs on current performance. Second, it is not easy for scholars to control for various types of nonequity alliances, which can be a potential source of bias. Lastly, although non-equity alliances can be
. affected by market structure or market characteristics, it is very hard for scholars to obtain such data for

some industries.
Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the effect of a single strategic alliance on the performance of
allied firms in a single industry, i.e., codesharing alliance' in the international airline industry. Also, to
control for some potential biases arising out of the selection of performance variables, we use the
market share of each airline in a specific market. The market shares of the involving airlines in a specific

The alliance involves one airline using its two-character designator code (e.g.. "NW" for Northwest Airlines) to
advertise a flight as its own in travel agents computer reservation systems, even though the flight is actually operated by
its partner. Such 'code-sharing' allows airlines to connect traffic from foreign cities, which they do not fly to, with their
flights. Because one airline lists another airline's flight as its own, that flight is listed twice in computer reservation
systems (once under each airline's code) 'md more times if connections are involved(Mead. 1995). Therefore. a codesharing alliance in a specific city-pair,market can directly affect the market shares of the involving airlines in that market.

city-pair market can be directly affected by a code-sharing alliance in that market because one airline can
Iist another airline's flight as its own through the alliance. Furthermore, to incorporate the market
characteristics, we use some concrete market data which is fortunately available in the international
airline industry. We also test how important the partner selection is in SA management.

The SA Effects on Performance
There are two main streams in the research of the SA performance. The majority of studies
measured the performance of SAs by instability, mortality and longevity and dichotomized them into
success and failure (Beamish, 1984; Blodgett, 1992; Franko, 1971; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Harnel,
1991; Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1989; Parkhe, 1991; Porter & Fuller, 1986). Considering the various
motives for forming SAs, we believe that this approach is too simple to measure the real effects of SAs
on performance. Dissolution of SAs does not necessarily mean failure, just as survival and longevity do
not necessarily reflect success. Other factors such as hidden agendas and conceptually flawed logic of
SAs may explain the high mortaIity rates and low performance levels more effectively than the explicit
and seemingly logical factors studied by various scholars. For example, as Parkhe (1993) argued,
longevity may be related not with high performance, but with high commitment of managers or high exit
bamers. When the objectives of SAs are temporary ventures such as learning specific skills, or when
SAs are used as "stepping stones" or transitional modes of organizational structure until firms figure out
more permanent or fitting structures, the dissolution of SAs should be planned, and would be
considered by the parents as a success rather than as a failure (Parkhe, 1993).
The other stream, but minority, is to use more qualitative methods to measure SA effects,
such as survey, case study, and combinations of several indices into one variable to measure

performance (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993; Parkhe, 1993). Although this approach can use more subjective
data and measure performance of

SAs more comprehensively than the first one, it has its own

limitations. Because respondents of a survey or a qualitative research are usually the persons who were
responsible for specific SAs and who have high commitment on their alliance projects, they might
evaluate SAs more positively than others. This respondent bias may disguise the real performance of
SAs. Furthermore, most samples of the previous studies have included a mix of various types of SAs
such as licensing, sub-contracting, joint venture, commercial agreement, and marketing cooperation.
They have also included various industries such as chemicals, machinery, transport, services, biotechnology, semi-conductor, and so on. Accordingly the biases created from the sample heterogeneity

of alliance types and industries may confuse or dilute measurement of the SA effect on performance.
Even though we need to have some reservation in interpreting the result of previous studies due
to these problems, SAs have implied some positive effect on the performance. Young, Smith and Grirnrn
(1994) analyzed pooled time-series data of 2,347 competitive moves undertaken by 111 unique firm in
the software industry from 1983 to 1991 and found out that allied firms outperformed other firms
without cooperative moves in this industry. Mitchell and Singh (1996) found that interFm collaboration
can increase the allied firms' sales in the analysis of 938 software system businesses for American
hospitals from 1961 to 1991. Harrigan (1988b) also suggested that among 895 SAs competing in 23
industries during the years 1924 to 1985, 45.3 percent of the ventures studied were judged to be
successful by their partners. Parkhe (1993) surveyed 342 top managers. sixty percent of them directly
responsible for the SAs, and found that game theoretic structure and partner nationality affected alliance
performance. Bleeke and Ernst argued that among the 49 SAs, 51 percent were successful for both
partners and only 33 percent resulted in failure for both. In their study. they employed two criteria to

measure performance; one was whether both partners achieved their ongoing strategic objectives, and
the other was whether both

recovered their financial costs of invested capital. Other studies

suggested that performance of SAs could be affected by governance structure, partners, and scope of
alliances (Axelrod & Keohane, 1986; Blodgett, 1992; Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Contractor &
Lorange, 1988; Geringer, 1991; G e ~ g e &
r Herbert, 1989; Legros & Matthews, 1993; Metcalfe,
1988; Oye, 1986; Paine & Power, 1984). Therefore, we hypothesize that strategic alliances will have
positive effects on the performance of the allied firms.
Hypothesis 1: Strategic alliance in a given market has a positive effect on the performance of allied
firms.

Partner Characteristics and Performance
-

Partner characteristics in SAs can be an important factor determining alliance performance.

Previous studies related partner characteristics with the SAs themselves rather than with the
performance of the allied firms. Even though no universal relationship has been found until now, KiUing
(1983) suggested that dominant partner alliances, among his three alliance categories, were more likely
to be successful, at least compared to shared management ventures. This result implied how firms

should select alliance partners and alliance patterns. On the other hand, Blodgett (1992) argued, in a
study of 1,025 joint ventures, that joint ventures with 5096-5096 division of equity were more stable
than those with uneven shares of equity. He also maintained that joint ventures in relatively open
economies were more unstable, as measured by shifting proportion of equity ownership, than joint
ventures in restrictive economies. Harrigan (1988b) investigated country origin effects on alliances.
According to her, cultural difference has a significant negative association with alliance success and a
positively impact on alliance duration. Kogut (1989) and Hanigan (1988b) posited that horizontal

alliances tended to be more successful than vertical ones and Parkhe (1991) identified the importance of
partner's resources. However, no general consensus has been emerged about the partner selection in
alliance management.
Considering the positive effect of pooling various resources such as technology, know-how,
brand image, and corporate identity (Pate, 1969; Nohria & Garcia-Pont, 1991; Pisano & Mang, 1992;
Shan & Hamilton, 1991), we argue that partner selection can affect SA performance. Especially in intercompetitor alliances in a given market, partner selection can be more important in alliance management
because the scope of available partners in inter-competitor alliances are restricted to the f i r m in the
given market. More significantly, partner selection in inter-competitor alliances may determine the
amount of resources that partner firms can utilize through alliances. In this respect, among intercompetitor alliances in the same market, the alliances between large h m may have stronger positive
effect on performance than those'between small firms due to the difference in the amount of resources.
Similarly, the alliances between existing firms may have stronger positive impact on performance than
those between new entrants due to know-how, brand image, marketing channels, and so on.
Hypothesis 2: SAs between current competitors or between large market sharers will have greater
impact on the allied firmsyperformaqce than SAs between new entrants or between small market
sharers.

Market Attributes and Performance
The impact of the strategy of a firm on its performance is one of the controversial issues in the
strategy field. The resource based theory provides a theoretical underpinning for explaining and
predicting significant firm effects (Barney, 1991; Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989; Jacobson, 1988;
Rumelt, 1984, 1987; Vasconcellos and Hambrick, 1989; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; etc.). Yet

their overemphasis on the intra-fm context leaves room for us to apply more comprehensive
approaches.
Industrial organization (10) theorists stimulated by Mason (1957) & Bain (1956) have
maintained that industry structure is more important than other factors in explaining firm performance.

In essence, I 0 theorists argue for a deterministic association between market structure and the average
performance of firms operating in the market (Bain, 1968; Caves, 1982; Demsetz, 1982; Mason, 1957;
Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990; Stigler, 1968; Tirole, 1988). In Line with I 0 theses, the marketing
literature has long emphasized the significance of market context and its implications for competitor
analysis, competition, and performance (Abell, 1980; Bass, Cattin & Wittink, 1978; Day, 1981; Fraser
& Bradford, 1983; Kotler & Armstrong, 1989; Lehmann & Winer, 1990; Urban, Johnson & Hauser,

1984; Weitz, 1985). Yet, there is a general lack of attention to the specific market context in which
firms compete with each other(Chen, 1994).
To test market context effects on performance of Sas, we incorporate market structure, market
fluctuation, and market growth. Considering the argument that the performance of joint ventures and
other forms of cooperation is more heavily influenced by their industries' structural traits than by the
partnership and diversification traits (Harrigan, 1986; 1988b), these variables may explain new
components of alliance effects on performance.
Market structure may be influenced by several factors such as the number of participating firms,

firmsize, concentration ratio, advertising-to-sales ratio, and so on. Among these factors, we focus on
the number of participating firms because it largely determines market structures, and because it also has
a major impact on the competitive intensity of a given market. The structure-conduct-performance
paradigm contends that an industry characterized by high levels of competitive behaviors has negative

consequences on

firm

performance and profit (Astley & Fombrun, 1983; Khandwalla, 1981; Scherer &

Ross, 1990; Stigler, 1968; Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1994). Intense competition in an industry or a
market can drive up the acquisition costs of needed resources. It also makes competition for products or
market positions more serious because competitors are more likely to attempt to respond to or deter
competitive attacks. Nanda (1994) argued that as the number of firms in an industry increased, a firm's
marginal revenue for any given output should decline. He also provided some evidences that the greater
the number of f m s in an industry, the more fierce the rivalry among competitors.

In the view of population ecology (Haman & Freeman, 1977; Singh, Tucker & House, 1986;
RomaneIli, 1988), as the number of firms increases, the population density also increases. Tiis process

wilI decrease the number of niches left in a given market and wiil increase the competitive intensity of
existing firms for resources and customers. Therefore the number of participating firms may determine
the competitive intensity as well as market structure. For example, the competitive intensity of a market
with many current firms and new entrants may be lower than that of another market with many current
. firms and new entrants. These differences in market structure, measured by the number of participating

firms,will moderate the SA effect on firm performance.
Hypothesis 3: The performance of strategic alliances will be negatively associated with the number of
participating firms in the markets.

Market share fluctuation can also be important because it represents the flexibility of the market.

In a more fluctuating market, market shares of existing firms tend to change more easily than otherwise.
Even though firms' strategies can make a difference in their performance, it is not easy for the firms to
increase their market shares when market shares of existing firms are stable over a long period of time.
Therefore firms can be more likely to increase their market shares through a specific strategy, like

rategic alliance, in fluctuating markets than stable markets. However, in a fluctuating, the effect of
As can be exhausted more quickly than in a stable market. For this reason we treat the effect of market
hare fluctuation as an open research question in this paper.
The growth rate of a market can moderate the competitive intensity of markets. As Day &
Jedungadi (1994) argue, "Early in the life cycle, when environmental uncertainty is mostly about
ustomer requirements and market demand, the representation will give greater salience to the customer
irnension. As growth slows and uncertainty about customer need abates, the emphasis is likely to shift
3

holding or gaining market share, which increases the salience of the competitor dimension."
When the growth rate of a market slows, firms' orientation to competitors and markets will be

ntensified, accentuating the competitive intensity of the given market. The growth rate of markets or
ndustries was found to influence profitab'ity of firms positively in a study of ten industries (Bass,
:attin & Wittink, 1978). For example, the competitive intensity in a fast growing market will be less
ikely to be intensified by new entrants than in a stagnant market. When market size decreases and
narket participants increase, the competitive intensity will most likely increase. Competitive intensity of
L

market usually has a negative relationship with performance of strategies as supported by Porter

:1976). Given that the growth rate of a market influences the competitive intensity of that market, the

~ o w t hrate of a market must moderate the individual firm performance which SAs can affect. However,
ow or stagnant growth rate of a market can drive incumbent firms to exit from the market, lowering the
:ompetitive intensity of that market. For this reason, we aIso treat the effect of market growth as an
,pen research question in this study.

Data and Analysis Method
The sample selection is critically important in this research. For the purpose of generalizing the
SA effects on firm performance, we must include various types of SAs in several industries. At the same
time, to measure the pure effect of SAs on performance, we need to delineate exogenous effects caused
by the differences in SA types and in the nature of industries. Considering the current state of art in SA
literature which is at an exploratory stage, we choose to take the second path, that is to investigate a
single SA in an industry. More specifically, we choose codesharing alliances in the international airline
industry as our sample.
Performance measurement is another issue we need to compromise. It is not easy to define the
exact scope of performance which could be directly influenced by SAs. Evaluating the effect of SAs in
terms of simple criteria may create spurious relationships because SAs are driven by various motives
and objectives such as reduced uncertainty, stabilized production, lower costs, quicker adaptation to
market,

technological and environmental shifts, and changes in consumer behaviors(Kono, 1984;

Contractor & Lorange, 1988; Gulati, 1993; Hagedoorn & Schakenrad, 1990; Harrigan, 1988a: Kogut,
1988; Parkhe, 1993; Pisano, 1990). However, if certain alliances between competitors in a given
market are driven by obvious objectives Like more efficient production or market share increase, they
can be evaluated in terms of a single criterion such as market share change or production cost. For
instance, if a firm makes alliances for larger market shares in a given market with competitors of the
market'in which it also does business, this alliance's effect on performance can be evaluated by the
change in market shares of the allied firms.we call this kind of alliance the inter-competitor
alliance(Park, 1995), i.e., alliance between competitors in the same market.

We will limit analysis scope in this study within the inter-competitor alliance to test the alliance
effect on performance. We seek to test whether SAs, in fact, have a linkage with performance
improvement by analyzing a single strategic alliance in a single industry- codesharing alliance in the
international airline industry. The reasons why we chose codesharing alliances in the international airline
industry are as follows: 1) we needed an industry which had a large number of a single-form alliance to
provide sufficient number of cases for the empirical study. Strategic alliances among international
airlines have proliferated more than in any other industry. The number of strategic alliances in the
international airline industry amounted to 263 as of 1994 July and to 177 during 1986-1993. This
abundance of alliances gives opportunities for statistical analysis; 2) because codesharing alliances in
specific routes usually aim to increase participating airlines' market shares in given markets,
performance of SAs can be appropriately measured in terms of changes in their market shares.
Therefore our choice of the sample is in line with the research guideline, that is to choose an industry
with well defined and separated markets so as to increase the robustness of the relationship between
independent and dependent variables (Gasscon, 1993; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Chen, 1994). In the
context of the international airline industry, a market is usually defined as a route or city-pair of two
different countries. Specifically, markets of international airline routes can be developed only with the
bilateral or multilateral contracts of countries, which can play the role of entry barrier to outside
airlines; 3) This industry has been traditionally known for its competitiveness (Bailey, Graham, &
Kaplan, 1985; D'Aveni, 1994), rich source of public information (Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Chen,
1994), and identifiable strategic resources(Levine, 1987; Taneja, 1989).
Among the 177 SAs that took place during the period of 1986-93, we selected the 99
codesharing alliances among fifty six airlines as the final sample of this study. A codesharing alliance

permits researchers not only to limit its effect within that route but also to use the context of the given
market as one of explanatory variables. We collected panel data about relevant markets and airlines in
the international airline industry from 1986 to 1993.
When we tried to use some statistical analysis methods to analyze panel data such as panel
probit model, panel logit analysis, or event history analysis, we encountered the problem that the
dependent variable of this study was not a binary but a continuous variable. So, we centered all panel
data on the point where codesharing alliances took place and pooled data of post-codesharing alliance
period. To analyze the codesharing effect on market share change, we used frequency test and
multivariate regression analysis.

Operationalization of Variables
Dependent Variable-Performance
Performance measurement has been one of the controversial topics in the business research.

-

Scholars are frequently advised to be careful in measuring performance with ROA, ROS, or operating
profit(Hax & Majluf, 1984; Venkatraman & Ramanujarn, 1985,1986). Market share, on the other hand,
has long been identified as one of the important variables that might affect a firm's strategy and the
relationship between its strategy and performance(Buzzel1, Gale, & Sultan, 1975; Ginsberg &
Venkatraman, 1985; Hofer, 1975; Prescott, Kohli & Venkatraman, 1986). It is also argued that market
share is largely free of aggregation biases and definition problems (Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986).
Support for market share as a determinant of profitability was provided in the BCG(1974) and PIMS
studies(1977). Therefore, we choose market share as a relevant indicator of performance in this study.

We measure changes in the sum of market shares of the two airlines which make a codesharing
alliance with each other in a specific international route. If the codesharing alliance is effective, the sum
of the market shares of the two partners will increase after the alliance agreement. The increase in the
sum of market shares implies that codesharing is a positive-sum game to the two airlines. If the
codesharing alliance is not effective, the sum of market shares of the two airlines wiU not change
significantly. The data for market shares of each airline was obtained from the T- 100 Data Bank 28 M
of U. S. Department of Transportation. The formula for market share change is as follows:

SMSh = Change in the sum of market shares of two airlines in market k at year t
MS* = Market share of airline i in market k at year t
MS* = Market share of airline j in market k at year t
MSko = Market share of airline i in market k at year 0 ,
MSjcQ = Market share of airline j in market k at year 0

Independent Variables
Alliance Period: We also controlled alliance period because it can moderate the effect of SAs on
performance. It was measured in terms of years after a codesharing alliance took place in a specific
route. Because some of the codesharing alliances that happened in 1986 lasted until 1993, the number of
alliance periods ranged Erom one to seven. Due to the data pooling, the research design of this paper
does not properly analyze the dynamic process of market share change along with the time lapse. We
expect, however, that this variable can allow us to control briefly the effect of the longevity of the
alliance period on performance improvement.

Partner Characteristics I & II: Partner characteristics were measured by the following two variables
each of which we divided into two groups along with market share and status of each airline in a
specific market:

Parlner characteristics I = 1 if each codesharing partner is an airline which has above-median market
share in that routc.
= 0 if otherwise.
Partner chrdcteristics I1 = 1 if each codesharing partner is an existing airline in that route.
= 0 if otherwise.
With these variables, we can test whether the effect of codesharing alliance on market share
increase is significantly different according to the characteristics of alliance partners. This test will give
us very useful implications about partner selection in inter-competitor alliance contract.

Market Structure: Market structure was divided into four groups by two criteria. One is the number
of existing airlines divided by the total revenue-passenger miles (RPM) of that route and the other is the
number of new entrants in a route divided by RPM of that route during the reseanh period. These two
numbers imply the number of existing or new entering airlines of each route per RPM. After finding the
median values of these two numbers, we divided 99 international routes into the following four groups
according

-

their structures;

group one- above median of existing airlines and above median of new entrants
group two- above median of existing airiines and below median of new entrants group
three- below median of existing airlines and above median of new entrants group
four- below median of existing airlines and below median of new entrants.

To test the relationship between market structure and performance increase through codesharing
alliances, we assigned a dummy variable for this market structure as follows.
MSSTR = 1 if the market structure of a given route belongs to group one,
= 0 if otherwise.

This dummy variable can distinguish the market structure effect of group one by assigning zero for the
other groups. Data for the market structure came from T-100 Data Bank 28 IM of U. S. Department of
Transportation.

Market Growth: Market growth was measured in terms of the percentile change of RPM in each year
divided by the previous year's RPM in that market. Data for this market growth measurement came
from T-100 Data Bank 28 IM of U. S. Department of Transportation. To control exceptional cases, for
instance, growing market with a decreasing number of airline companies or a decreasing market with an
increasing number of airline companies, the growth rate of the market was divided by the growth rate of
airline numbers in a given market. This process can reflect the change of competitive intensity which
results from the change of the number of serving airlines And the change of market size. To use the
market growth variable as an independent variable, which required one year's data loss, we shortened
the research period from 1986-1993 to 1987-1993.
Market Share J?luctuation2: Market share fluctuation was assessed by adding the absolute values of
percentile changes in market shares of all airlines in a market, compared to those of the previous year:

MFL,

= Market share fluctuation of the market k at year t.
M S , = Market share of airline j in the market k at year t.
MS,,l = Market share of airline j in the market k at year t-1.

The mean value of the market share fluctuation is 47.89%,much higher than expected in the airline industry, which is
shown in Table 1. The formula for the market share fluctuation resulted in the exmaordinally high mean value because
the change of market share for all airline companies in a route was summed in terms of absolute value. For example, if
airline A loses 5% of market share in a market and airline B gets 5% of market share in the market, then the fluctuation
of market share should be 10% according to the formula. The other reason is that the data set of this study was originally
constructed with a 10% sample of passengers of each route. This may create a virtual fluctuation of market shares.

This variable can measure the stability of a given market. For instance, when the market share of
each airline in a given market repeatedly increases and decreases, the value of this variables becomes
large, implying a great market share fluctuation. The data of market fluctuation was also obtained from
the same source of market growth.

Control Variables
Market Size: The market size can moderate the relationship between the codesharing alliance and
market share increases in the airline industry because it influences the industry structure as well as the
competitive intensity within a given market. For example, market structure, competitive intensity, and
strategic behavior patterns of firms in a large market are different from those in a small market.
Therefore, we control market size which we measured by the adding RPMs of all airlines in a given
market in each year. The information on market size was mainly drawn from the U.S. Department of
Transportation database system which was constructed with ten percent sample data of total travelers
in international routes.

Experience in Strategic Alliance: Through multiple SAs, participating firms can accumulate knowhow how to manage alliances. These learning effects were supported by some empirical studies (Hamel,
1991; Mody, 1993; Park, 1995). This alliance experience can influence the effect of current alliance on
performance improvement. We measured experience in strategic alliances by the simple summation of
the number of prior SAs which both of alliance partners have established until a given year, with
information drawn from the Airline Business. We included the SAs which were formed before 1986 but
excluded the alliances after 1993. These numbers reflected all kinds of alliances conducted in the airline
industry, such as joint venture, marketing agreement, block space agreement, maintenance agreement,

cooperation on the expansion of airport, joint frequent flyer program, ground handling joint venture,
and joint scheduling, in addition to codesharing.

Results
Tables 1 and 2 present basic descriptive statistics and correlation for the variables used in this
study. There are no serious problems of multicollinearity across the independent variables for the total
sample. Because the correlation between market structure and market size was significantly high, we
developed two other models which contained only one of the two variables, market structure and
market size. However, the results of these two models were not significantly different from the result of
the model reported in the following section. The high correlation between partner characteristics I and

II did not cause serious problems because the models which had only one of the two f i a n c e types
revealed equivalent signs and significance with the models reported here.

Insert Table 1 & 2 about here

...........................

The hypotheses of this study were tested sequentially and the results are reported in Table 3 and

4. Regarding the f i s t hypothesis that SAs will have a positive effect on performance of the allied firms,
the result of the frequency test is reported in Table 3. For 62.8 percent of samples, the sum of market
shares of the allied airlines increased after alZiance formation, much greater than the number of samples
of which the sum of market shares decreased. The maximum of the decrease in the sum of market shares
after alliance was -35.9 percent while the maximum of increase in the sum of market shares after alliance

was 99.4 percent.' The median of the change in market share sum was 3.5%. Therefore the fact that
SAs have a positive effect on performance improvement was supported by the results of this study.

Insert Table 3 about here

.......................

Two models in table 4 were significant as indicated by the values of R square and F-value.
Positive(negative) coefficients of variables reported in table 4 indicate positive(negative) effect of intercompetitor alliances on performance, measured by the change in the sum of market shares of two
airlines in a specific market, with respect to that variable. The standard errors of coefficients are in
parentheses.
To test the effect of each independent variable on performance of SAs, we developed two
models based on different assumptions about the relationship between SA period and performance. The
first model assumed a linear relationship with respect to these two variables. The underlying logic is that
the alliance effect will increase with lapse of time because it takes time for managers to learn about this
new cooperative system and for consumers to acknowledge the strategic change. Also, the effects of
strategy implementation usually tend to have a certain time lag. The second model supposed a nonlinear relationship between the two variables. It tests if a specific year has a significant relationship with
performance. In the first model, the alliance period had a positive effect on market share increase while
none of the six time dummy variables for each of the 7 years was significant in the second model. This
supported a positive linear relationship between alliance period and performance.

Insert Table 4 about here

.......................

99.4%. the increase of the sum of market shares of two airlines, is much higher than expected. This results from some
extreme cases of sample which consist of only a few airline companies serving for the small nurnber of passengers.

As hypothesized, the partner characteristics I variable has. a positive effect at 1% significance
evel. This implied that the effects of codesharing alliances between large market sharers on
~erformancewas greater than those between small market sharers. However, the partner characteristics

:I variable, measured by the status of airlines in a market, has a negative effect oil performance at the
;ignifcance level of 1%. That is, codesharing alliances between new entrants increased their sum of
This result suggests that it
narket shares in a specific market more than those between existing air~ines.~
IS relatively

easier for new entrants to get some new market shares in a given market than for existing

Eims to acquire some additional market shares.
The research shows the negative effect of the market structure variable on performance,
significant at 10% level. This means that the alliance effec~on performance is likely to be greater in
markets with fewer current competitors and new entrants than in markets with more current
competitors and new entrants. This conlimed again the I0 paradigm positing the negative relationship
between the number of market participants and performance. Two open research questions are also
supported at 1% significance level. These results show that SAs might contribute to performance
increase greater in the fluctuating or growing markets than in the stable or decreasing markets. These
results can be interpreted as follows: the possibility of market share increase niay be greater in more
fluctuating or faster growing markets than otherwise.

"

The correlation between market shares of airlines and market status was not significant at 10% level though the result

w,?s not reported here.

Discussion
We believe that this study increased robustness of research design testing the relationship
between SAs and their impact on performance through the controI of sampIe biases: one type of
alliance, codesharing alliance, and its direct effect on market share. Compared to the previous studies
measured duration or survival ratio of alliance, the result of this study may provide scholars and
managers with more precise implications about the effect of SAs on performance.
For managers, this study confirms that SA may increase performance of sponsoring fkms
represented in terms of market share, market status, sales, or size. Specifically, for managers of airline
companies, we expect this study to give a concrete answer to the question-whether airlines should make
alliances with other airlines or not. The second lesson concerns partner selection. Inter-competitor
alliance can seriously affect the competitive dynamics of firms in a market because a partner in an intercompetitor alliance is yesterday's competitor. The performance inprovement through SAs can be
significantly affected by partner selection. For example, in the case of large market sharers, it is better to

- select an equivalent airline as an inter-competitor alliance partner than smaller airlines in a given market.
Lastly, airline managers should take into account the market context when they are going to establish a
new SA such as market structure, market growth rate, and market share fluctuation.
This study, however, has a number of Limitations in generalizing the empirical results into other
industries. First, this paper analyzes only codesharing alliances in the international airline industry. The
result of this study restricts the possibility of generalization into other forms of alliances, such as joint
venture, licensing, R & D consortium, or marketing agreement. Second, the observation period after
strategic alliance formation is only six years which is not long enough to evaluate the long-term effect of
alliances. Third, the market share of an airline at a specific point could be affected by other factors such

zj special package promotion, advertising, and price discount. However, this study can not control

these kinds of promotional activities of airline companies. These restrictions may require researchers to
be careful in interpreting results and also to do further research about various aspects of strategic

alliances.
There is a need for strategy scholars to analyze the following topics which are related to what
we have attempted in this research. The dynamic process of performance change with the lapse of

alliance periods is an important issue in SA analysis. The distribution of increased performance through

alliances between two or more allied firms is also a very sensitive and interesting topic. These more
detailed topics are waiting for challenges from bright scholars as well as the generalization of research
results of this study.
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Table 2 . Pearson Correlation Matrix

N of Cases: 215

1-tailed Significance:

* - .O1 -

** - ,001

Table 4 Result of Multivariate Regression about Market Share Change
Variables

. Model 2

Model 1

(Constant)
Alliance Period
Partner Characteristics I
Partner Characteristics 11
Market Structure
Markct Fluc[u;~tion
Market Growth
Market Size
S u n of Prior Alliances
Time Dummy 87
Time Dummy 88
Time Dunmy 89
Time Dummy 30
Time dununy 91
Time dwruny 92

R Square
F

0.2479
8.4909

***

*** < 0.01 ** < 0.05

.

0.2M7
5.5667

* < 0.10.

***
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Introduction
The Canada US "Open Skies" negotiation took place during a brief period which
spanned the fall of 1994 and early 1995. It was conducted first through personal
representatives, and later in formal bargaining sessions. Afler nearly 30 years of
acrimonious exchanges between the two governments, the 1995 agreement was concluded
with surprisingly little difficulty, and has ushered in a new era in transborder air transport.

-

This paper draws heavily on research presented in a longer paper entitled Break in
Overcast: The Negotiation of the 1995 Can&-US Open Skies Agreemenf,' which
discussed the dynamics of the negotiations in 1991-92 and 1994 Elliot-Kaplan talks. The
current paper focuses on Canadian carrier strategy before and after the agreement.
The History of Canada-US Bilateral Agreements
The nature of Canada-US bilaterals has been tempered by a number of &tors: asymmetries of
market structure and size, and differences in ideology and state preferences. Transborder
agreements have never been particularly easy to negotiate. The 1949 agreement was the first
to grantfifihfleeciom and this agreement was amended in 1959, when several routes were
added. By the mid-1S60s, both parties were dissatisfied with the agreement, but the resulting
1966 agreement took four years to negotiate and in the end was only successll following
personal interventions by the US President, h e Canadian Prime Minister, and the Canadianborn economist and former US Ambassador John Kenneth Galbraith (Chesen 1989: 7).
The 1966Air Transport Agreement was modified in 1974. The US sought an agreement
to cover charter nights, while Canada sought more and longer routes for its carriers.
Again, the process was protracted, lasting more than two years. The result was three
separate agreements which covered supplementary services: the 1974 Non-Scheduled
Services Agreement which concerned charters, the 1974 Pre-Clearance Agreement, and a
route agreement which granted US carriers 23 new routes and 5 route additions, and 14
new routes and 3 route additions to Canadian carriers.
This negotiation preceded the deregulation of the US market and the deployment of the
hub&-spoke
route systems, and was a very limited Bermuda-pattern bilateral exchange
of routes. The new traffic patterns produced by deregulation in the US sparked almost
immediate demands by the US carriers for routes which fed into their hubs. As well, the
US government wished to liberalize tariff-setting on the routes. Canadian carriers,
operating in a market with a different structure and regulatory environment, and desiring
far fewer routes than were demanded by the US carriers, were lukewarm to these
proposals.

'

This paper by the present author was written as a graduate research essay at the Noman
Paterson School of International Mairs, Carleton University, October 1996.
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The "bean-counting rounds" of 1979-82 were unproductive, and produced considerable
bitterness on both sides of the border. Two years later, in an attempt to produce a history
of success, several lesser disputes were addressed through exchanges of diplomatic notes:
the Regional, Local and Commuter Services Agreement, and the Experimental
TransborderAir services ~ r o g r a n t .The
~ 1984 Exchange of Notes on Regional, Local,
and Commuter Services (RLCS notes) was an addendum to the bilateral agreement which
covered services by aircraft of 60 or fewer seats. The notes allowed for automatic
qualification for new services on some routes, while others could be flown under
discretionary approval fiom both governments.
Position papers were exchanged in the 1980s. The Canadian position on routes allowed
for the granting of cabotage extensi~nsfor both countries; the US proposed "Open Skies"
liberalization of international routes only, with no domestic rights.3 The Canadian
position on tariffs was somewhat less liberal. Where the US suggested a virtually
unregulated regime, requiring double disqprovaI' to block tariff changes, Canada
favoured a regime less restrictive than the prevailing one, but which contained safeguards
against destructive competition and rate wars.
By 1991, however, it was clear to virtually all parties that the agreement was stifling
transborder market growth. The Canada-US aviation market is the "single biggest bilateral
air relationship in the world, with more than 13 million air passengers in 1989 generating
approximately $2.3 billion in revenue" (Transport h;Tinister Doug Lewis quoted in
Financial post5 1991:12).~However, while passenger traffic between Canada and its
other markets grew by 5.9 per cent annually between 1980 and 1989, the average growth
in the Canada-US market was only 2.3 per cent (Carr, 1991). While long-term growth in
air travel worldwide is significantly higher than the growth in total trade, the transborder
air services between the two countries had underperformed trade growth. The United
States Airports for Better International Air Service (USA-BIAS) lobby estimated that, had
a less restrictive air agreement been put in place in 1980, the transborder market would
have handled 15.1 million passengers in 1989, instead of 8.3 million (actual), generating
$9.3 biion more in benefits to airport communities (USA-BIAS 1990). Despite this, of
the 238 US hub-Canadian city pairs which could have been served, only 28 per cent had
non-stop or one-stop service (USA-BIAS 1990).
GeofEey Elliot was External Affairs' Chief Air Negotiator for the 1984-85 rounds,
which constituted an attempt to repair the relationship. The actual negotiation of treaties is
conducted by External Affairs (now the Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade DFAIT) while Transport Canada is responsible for developing the negotiating
mandate and providing policy and technical advice to the Chief Air Negotiator.
The use of the term "Open Skies" in transborder talks dates to this period.
Both governments would have to reject a tariff change for it to be disallowed.
Financial Post Conference Open Skies: l2rive or Survive in rhe Deregulated ' 9 0 ~ ~
hereafter FP9 1.
6
The discrepancy between this and the previous cited figure probably arises fiom the
exclusion of charter tr&c and transborder portions of international journeys.

-
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There were also imbalances in the t r a c . The market share of US carriers on transborder
routes has risen over the life of the agreement. While only 40 per cent of transborder
tra£Ec originated in the US, American airlines carried 60 per cent of it, earning
approximately $500 million more in revenue than Canadian camers. This gap had grown
by almost 90 per cent between 1981 and 1987 (Desrochers, FP91: 57).
For its part, the US continued to press for a liberalized agreement called "Open Skies" in
which there would be no restrictions on routes, capacity, or tarifXs, and which would be
effective immediately on the signing of the agreement. This was clearly a political nonstarter in Canada, where voter sentiment is easily aroused by any concessions to US
interests over Canadian. While some Canadian stakeholders favoured immediate Open
Skies, the airlines were amenable only to an agreement which was phased in over time.
Smaller communities, which feared they might lose services, and labour, which feared job
loss, could be counted upon to lobby strongly against any rapid deregulation of the
transborder market. The Progressive Conservative government under Brian Mulroney had
concluded a Free Trade Agreement with the US, despite strong opposition from economic
nationalists, organized labour, and left-wing political parties. There was a limit to its
abiity to negotiate a liberal air transport agreement.
The 1991-92 Negotiations
Twelve rounds of bilateral negotiations were conducted in 1991-92, but ended in deadlock
on a number of key issues. These included Canadian access to the US market (airport
access standards and the "slots" issue") and safeguards for the Canadian industry (which
had come to be seen as a phase-in period). Also under discussion were the "Fly America"
policies, traf£ic rights involving third countries, code-sharing, pricing issues, harmonization
of standards, dispute settlement, and a range of issues pertaining to customs. Momentum
on the slots issue, in particular, had slowed to a crawl far short of agreement. Both
negotiating teams were exhausted and hstrated. The end of the Bush administration in
the US added to the difficulties. The US team's mandate to negotiate was increasingly
questioned, and eventually the head negotiator resigned.
The failure of the talks, though it was largely a function of competing stakeholder
demands, left virtually none of the stakeholders on either side of the border satisfied. The
1966 agreement was a bottleneck in the firther development of a market of significant
value. While both sides recognized this, there was little political will to engage in another
hitless negotiation.
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The Elliot-Kaplan Framework Talks
After the breakdown of talks in 1992, the Progressive Conservative government was
defeated in the election of 1993, and the Liberal Party took power. The new Minister of
Transport, Doug Young, agreed with the consensus that the agreement needed to be
modernized, but had other pressing issues on which he placed a higher priority. His
officials at Transport Canada continued to hold the view that some sort of agreement
might be possible, even if it was a series of partial agreements like those which had been
created to address specific issues in the 1980s.
Federico Pena, the Secretary of the US Department of Transportation (DOT), held similar
views about the value of partial agreements. Like Young, he had no previous investment
in the failed negotiation. At a meeting on an unrelated matter, Young and Pena concluded
that they would like to try to break the log jam. Each would send a single personal
representative to conduct a series of meetings, the purpose of which was to describe the
areas in which an agreement was possible.
The two representatives would discuss in good faith, and with the clear understanding that
they spoke with the blessing of their respective top officials, but any result they reached
would be non-binding, and concessions made in the course of the discussions were not,
themselves, binding for any future negotiation. It was fbrther agreed that neither
representative could be a principal in the previous failed negotiations. This latter
condition was meant to ensure that the two had not built up entrenched views as a result
of a long and unsuccessll bargaining process.
The representatives eventually agreed upon were GeofEey Elliot and Stephen Kaplan,
both experienced in air negotiations. Elliot had been Chief Air Negotiator for Canada's
Department of External Affairs fiom 1983 to 1986, and was well-known in the industry.
He subsequently sewed as Consul General of Canada in Atlanta, Georgia, and at the time
he was asked to hold the talks, had been an executive of a major Canadian forest products
company for five years. Stephen Kaplan was Senior Counsel for the US DOT, and was
well-acquainted with the bilateral process.
The Elliot-Kaplan Process
When Elliot was contacted by Assistant Deputy Minister of Transport Moya Greene in the
early summer of 1994, the proposal was for a couple of meetings with a US negotiator
over a two-week period. If no assurances of success could be given, the issue would be
dropped. In subsequent discussions with Transport Minister Young, however, Elliot
pointed out that the only way that he could guarantee a successll outcome to any
proposed talkswould be if all the issues which had led to failure in the past were prenegotiated. In any case, though he was willing to have informal discussions, Elliot was
unwilling to lead a formal government negotiating team. It was agreed that he would
report directly to the Minister.
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Elliot and Kaplan first met in September 1994 at a hotel in downtown Toronto. The
meeting was attended by Transport Minister Young and his executive assistant, Secretary
Pena, and US Ambassador to Canada, James Blanchard. After a brief introduction, the
two negotiators were left alone to chart their course. Elliot and Kaplan came to an almost
immediate meeting of minds. They agreed that both their respective governments would
not enter into fonnal negotiations if they could not be assured of success, and that:

0

meetings would be private, with only one junior note-taker7 present for each side,
meetings would not take place in government offices,
the objective of their talks would be to idenm all issues which were deal-breakers and
reach substantive agreement on them, and that
they would submit one agreed-upon document to their political masters "as a
package".

Elliot and Kaplan felt that most of the small issues could be set aside with confidence that
if the big issues could be solved, these could be negotiated later by governments. Four
meetings took place, which were supplemented by phone conversations.' Meetings
alternated between Washington and Toronto. In Washington they met in the Grand Hotel,
in Toronto at the office of the forest products company at which Elliot was then working.
The meetings which followed resulted in a 13-page briefing note to the respective
governments, called Frameworkfor Resumption of Canada-USTransborderAir
Negofiafions,or simply the "Framework Agreement". It recommended a set of principles
which were agreeable to both Elliot and Kaplan, and laid out the major issues. Issues
which were secondary were noted at the end of the document. Several major issues
relating to US pre-clearance at Canadian airports were considered outside the mandate of
the two representatives. These were noted and left aside, with the recommendation that
governments address them only after an Open Skies deal was reached.
The Negotiation of the 1995 Air Agreement
As the government negotiating teams got down to settling the details and converting the
document into legal language, it rapidly became evident that both sides viewed the
Framework provisions as unalterable. Neither side attempted to re-negotiate a major
provision, recognizing that any such attempt risked disturbing the Framework provisions
on other major issues. In one or two cases the governments still had to resolve differences
in interpretation of the Framework language however, on the whole, the precise
terminology used by Kaplan and Elliot had the desired effect of making the terms of

'The note-taker was to be a person who had not been substantively involved with the file.
The meetings were October 17-18 1994 in Washington, November 14-15 in Toronto,
November 30-December 2 in Washington, and December 12-13 in Toronto.
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resolution for each issue very clear. This tended to speed up the process to some extent,
since only relatively minor issues remained under discussion.
Another impetus to the rapid conclusion of the agreement was the recognition that if it
could be completed by February 1995, it could be signed during President Clinton's visit
to Ottawa which had been planned for some time. The visit was a diplomatic courtesy,
and no outstanding event had been identified for it. The signing of a major international
agreement such as "Open Skies" offered an opportunity for the White House press office
to showcase the President's diplomacy. This leant a measure of urgency to the US team's
efforts and may have allowed the Canadian team a degree of leverage which it generally
lacked in negotiations with the US.

Open Skies as a Product of Changing Strategy
In Break in Overcast, a number of changes were presented as contributing the success of
the Elliot-Kaplan talks. These included changes in the Canadian politics as the benefits of
the FTA and NAFTA became more clearly understood, changes within the airline industry
brought on by globalization, and changes in US legislation which made the slots issue
easier to manage for DOT (Gleimer, 1996). The change in the bargaining process was
also a decisive factor. The Elliot-Kaplan fiamework collapsed the bargaining into a oneshot game, reducing uncertainty and the potential'for strategic behaviour among the
stakeholders.

These factors were all important, but this paper concentrates on one significant change:
the wibgness of the air carriers to buy into the Elliot-Kaplan process in the first place. In
previous iterations, bargaining had been carried out with the airlines at the table. While
the Minister had brought a variety of other stakeholdersto the table in 1991-92, airline
representatives considered them to be unnecessary, and discussions took place to which
these other members were not privy.
The approach of using a single government negotiator, without direct airline participation,
was unprecedented. Air Canada and Canadi>n were willing to accept this in 1994, partly
because of the evolution of very diierent corporate strategies, each of which could be
facilitated by a liberalized agreement.
The carriers started the 1991 negotiations with very diierent views of what an agreement
should look like. Air Canada had a dominant position relative to its domestic rival on the
transborder. It had route authorities and slots for virtually all of the routes which
interested it at the time. The exception was Washington National, and this airport, for
reasons too involved to mention here, was treated as a separate issue in the negotiations.
The status quo was not perfect for Air Canada, but the "cost of no-agreement" was low.

Putnam (1988) provided the fiamework used in Break in Overcast.
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At the outset, Air Canada had held that some sort of limited cabotage for Canadian
carriers in the US could "level the playing fieldn. Leo Desrochers, Executive %cePresident Marketing and Sales, commented that:

the abiity of Canadian carriers to carry passengers beyond domestic US gateways
could be another means of off-setting the huge imbalance and inherent advantage
US carriers now enjoy (FP91: 59).
The issue has been seen in another light, however. As long as cabotage was on the table,
it could be used to scuttle the negotiations, since the US was very unlikely to accept it.
The issue pointed to a split within Air Canada management:
Claude Taylor gives the impression open skies with cabotage is the ultimate price.
Other Air Canada spokespersons talk about the due consequences of any form of
cabotage. Canadian Airliies are at least consistent on the cabotage issue; they are
opposed (Bourgeois, FP9 1: 32).
By some accounts, this reflects a "schizophrenia" in which the carrier's management was
split among three strategic responses. The first was a tactical response, keeping cabotage
on the table and using it as an excuse to kill any potential agreement which they
considered negative on other dimensions. A second group was affected by a "hubris"
which caused them to believe that they could be a global carrier for them, the expansion
of market into the US was a stepping stone to a global position. A third group was
violently opposed to the idea, and considered it a "doomsday" option. This ambiguous
situation within Air Canada no doubt contributed to the vagueness of their proposals, led
to frustrations among other stakeholders, and may have impeded coalition forming among
them.

-

Air Canada's public statements, made clear references to the economic rents that the
airline wished to gain and to protect, domestically and internationally, but did not indicate
any strong desire for a liberalized transborder market.
Canadi>n's view on cabotage was, as mentioned, consistent. Cabotage, according to
Executive Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer Kevin Jenkins was "a solution
where there is no problem". The notion of trading some measure of cabotage in Canada
for Canadian access in the US would not address any existing capacity shortage on either
side of the border and, he argued, "the potential downside for the Canadian industry is far
greater than the upside" (FP91: 65).
A domestic issue also would have to be addressed in any negotiation which led to the
acquisition of new routes. Canadih's, Kevin Jenkins, was of the opinion that
the extent to which our domestic competitor is larger than us is attributable in
large measure to their far greater access to US routes. The next agreement must
reflect the new reality. (FP91: 65)
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In other words, Canadia could be counted upon to lobby for a larger share of the new
routes to address what it perceived as an uneven existing arrangement. By blocking a new
agreement, Air Canada would preserve its own dominant position.

While Canadia was not as clearly protectionist as Air Canada, its initial bargaining
position was not a formula for "Open Skiesn but for a somewhat more liberalized
Bermuda-style bilateral. It addressed the issues of new senrice requirements within a
fiamework which implied continued government control over the development of
incremental route additions.
The reason Canadih opposed cabotage was not limited to the perception that there was
no capacity shortage which provided a market opportunity. Canadi>n was in the process
of negotiating a deeper strategic alliance with American Airlines, in which the airlines used
codesharing extensively. This meant that Canadian had little to gain from cabotage in the
US, since moving its passengers in the US was most effectively handled by code-sharing
with its much-larger US partner. This strategy grew in importance through the period of
the negotiations.
The cost of no-agreement for Canadih was a limitation on its ability to serve transborder
routes, and the continuation of its competitive disadvantagevis-A-vis its domestic rival.
While Canadi>n favoured an agreement, the cost of failure was still relatively low
compared to an outcome which might have benefited Air Canada. It is d i c u l t to
imagine, however, that the Canadian government could have constructed a more
favourable situation for Air Canada than it already had. Air Canada completely dominated
the Canadian share of scheduled transborder tr&c.

The Airlines in 1994
In the period between the failed 1991-92 talks and the "Framework talksn, several
developments modified the perceptions of the cost of no-agreement. The first was the
resolution of the Gemini computer reservation system dispute.'' This had been a
protracted battle in which the fate of Canadi>n hung in the balance. The decision, in
which Canadi>n was allowed to withdraw fiom the contract and purchase its services
from American Airlines' W R E , was less important than the implications it had for the
strategic alliances of the two airlines. Canadi>n was able to pursue a strategy based on
integration with American Airlines operations through code-sharing which ultimately
resulted in an anti-trust exemption under US law in 1996 for their combined operation.
In the period between the failed negotiations and the Elliot-Kaplan Framework
discussions, Air Canada also built alliances with major US carriers United and Continental,
taking an equity position in the latter. By 1993, Jean-Jacques Bourgeault articulated an
-

CanadiBn sought to withdraw fiom the CRS which was jointly owned by the two
airlines.
lo
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Air Canada strategy based on alliances, in which increased US access was a key selling
point to its partners:
Our niche at Air Canada is largely geographical. ... Of course, we cannot compete
with the mega carriers plane for plane, route for route, passenger for passenger.
What we can do is develop our niche as a strong Canadian-based international
carrier, the "cornerstone" for a global alliance. To do that, we need the mutual
marketing fit of other complementary carriers to develop our p~tential.~'

-

Another strategic change was the deployment of regional jets (RJs) by Air Canada starting
late in 1994. The 50-seat Canadair RJs could operate under the "RLCS notes", which
meant that new route approval was possible without a new bilateral agreement. In
September 1994, Air Canada took delivery of the first of its RJ fleet. It had made firm
orders for 10 aircraft, conditional orders for a W h e r 14, and held options for another 24
(Bombardier 1994b: 2). The &st 24 were destined for operations under the RLCS notes,
the others were earmarked for operations under "Open Skiesn.
Air Canada had the cash on hand to finance acquisition of a small RJ fleet for transborder
operations, a move which its cash-strapped competitor could not match. In other words,
the differentiation of the strategies provided an environment in which both carriers were
receptive to a more liberalized agreement, though for dierent reasons. Air Canada,
which had traditionally been the more prote&tionist of the cders, had seen an opportunity
to build a new market which required liberalization. The cost of no-agreement had
increased.
Predictions on the Signing of the Agreement
The signing of the new bilateral agreement was greeted with a predictable bally-hoo by
politicians on both sides of the border. The United States praised it as a glowing example
of the success of its liberalization policies in air transport. Canadian politicians portrayed
it as a good economic deal in which the air carriers received long-sought access to the US
market and a transition period in which to adapt to open competition with their much
larger US rivals.
Both Transport Canada and US DOT released predictions of economic benefits to
communities and consumers as well as to air carriers. By the end of the first year, these
predictions seemed to have been borne out, at least if a growth in the number city-pairs
served by the carriers is a good measure. In fact, Air Canada, which had promised 20 new
routes in 18 months, in fact had 31 routes in place by October 1996 (Pustay 1997: 29).

11

Financial Post. 1993. IntemationaZ Air TransportationForum. Tuesday, 3 August,
1993 (hereafter FP93), page 7.
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T r S c growth in the year following the agreement exceeded one million passengers (The
Impact of the New US-Canada Aviation Agreement at Its First Anniversary: summary12),
representing a growth estimated at 15 per cent 5 times the historic average. While
official statistics have yet to be released, growth is estimated in the same range for the
second year.

-

Canadian Carrier Approaches to Open Skies

Air Canada
The response of carriers to the agreement in the first 15 months was quite different, for a
number of reasons. The Canadian carriers seemed to be quickest off the mark, especially
Air Canada, which deployed its fleet of Canadair RJs on routes from Toronto and
Montreal to smaller US cities which had generally been served by one-stop routes over the
major US hubs. Air Canada increased its total number of transborder flights by 40 per
cent from 43,000 to 60,000 which accounted for 84 per cent of the total increase by
Canadian camers (Statistics Canada Catalogue No. 5 1-206-XPB, 1995: vii).

-

-

By May of 1996, Air Canada had announced diiect connections to Nashville, Kansas City,
Columbus, Philadelphia, and Washington Dulles from Toronto. From Montreal, it added
Philadelphia. The most sought-after routes, diiect fiom Toronto and Montreal to
Washington National, were added, and were served by USAir as well. Air Canada also
connected the Canadian hubs to the US hubs at Atlanta, Minneapolis, and St. Louis.
Twelve of the routes which were added were "charter conversions". These sun
destination routes had been served by charter service. Air Canada converted routes from
Toronto to Ft. Lauderdale, Ft. Myers, Las Vegas, Orlando, and West Palm Beach to
scheduled service, and from Montreal to Orlando and Ft. Lauderdale. Vancouver charters
to Honolulu and Kahului/Maui were also converted. Nor was this process limited to the
hubs. W a x charters to Orlando and Tampa were converted, as was a Winnipeg to
Orlando route.

Air Canada, as mentioned earlier, purchased Canadair CL65 "RJsn for use in its non-stop
"hub-busting" strategy. These could have been deployed without the Open skies
agreement, because the 50-seat aircraft was allowed to fly transborder routes under the
RLCS Notes. In addition to non-hub city markets however, RJs are also used on Toronto
flights to Chicago, Minneapolis, and St. Louis, and in combination with wide-body Airbus
A320 flights on the Toronto-Atlanta route. This latter development is noteworthy, since it
demonstrates that the RJs allow not only the service of low-volume routes, but also allow
greater capacity flexibility on higher volume routes. A320 service has been added on the
Vancouver routes to Denver and Los Angeles, Toronto-Denver, and Calgary-Houston
pairs.
l2

Office of International Aviation, US DOT, hereafter OIA96.
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Canadih added capacity much less aggressively in the transborder market for a number of
reasons, primarily financial. Instead, it proceeded with an extensive code-sharing
agreement with its partner and shareholder, American Airlines. This,under the
circumstances, was the most efficient approach to the market.
Canadi>n suffered under a historic disadvantage on the transborder routes. Air Canada,
as a matter of policy, had been allocated all but a few of the routes under previous
bilaterals, and was firmly established with reasonable slots at the US hubs. It had an
existing marketing presence in these markets. Penetration of the transborder market by
Canadi>n would have involved significant marketing costs, aside fiom the costs of
purchasiig new aircraft. American, on the other hand, was well established in the US
domestic market.
The major benefit of the transborder for Canadih probably did not lie in the new routes it
could create, but in the traffic which could be fed into its Pacific route system by American
over the Vancouver hub. American added non-stops from Kennedy and Miami to
Vancouver in year 2 of the agreement.
The Mami hub flight was perhaps the most interesting, in that it highlighted a source of
strategic advantage for Vancouver International (YVR). American collects tr&c from its
large Latin American network, and can then feed it to Canadi>n over YVR. From Sao
Paulo, for instance, this comes about as close as is feasible to a "great circle route" to the
Orient. Vancouver, itselfl is 3-1/2 hours closer to Hong Kong than the US gateway at
Los hgeles.13 This topic will be discussed in greater detail below.
Canadih had 21 charter conversions, which represented significant portion of its response
to liberalization. Routes fiom Toronto to Ft. Lauderdale, Ft. Myers, Orlando, St.
Petersburg, Sarasota, and West Palm Beach, and from Vancouver to Las Vegas, Palm
Springs and Reno were converted. Non-hub routes fiom Calgary to Los Vegas, Los
Angeles, Palm Springs and Phoenix, from Edmonton to Las Vegas, fiom Halifax to Ft.
Lauderdale, Orlando, and St. Petersburg, and fiom Winnipeg to Las Vegas and Palm
Springs were also brought into scheduled service.
Service to the American hubs was modestly increased. Canadih added routes from
Vancouver and Toronto to Chicago, and from Toronto to La Guardia. These routes were
necessary additions because C a n a d h had received slots at these airports in the Open
Skies agreement under a "use-it-or lose it" policy, and its alliance partner, American, was
still bound by the phase-in provisions of the agreement. In addition to the routes already
mentioned, which fed traffic between the partners, American chose to use its allocations at
Montreal, adding routes fiom Miami and Kennedy. Canadi>n added no transborder routes
13

Transport Canada Backgrounder: One Stop Process Enhances Competitiveness of
Canadian Airports and Airlines, April 9, 1997, hereafter TCB97.
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to Montreal, perhaps allowing its more healthy partner to compete against existing routes
fiom Air Canada's hub.
In 1995, Canadi>n leased 3 "jumbo" airliners, a Boeing 747-400 and two DC 10-30%for
use on long-haul routes, fieeing up 3 of their Boeing 737s for use on the transborder
routes (Cassels, Brock and Blackwell 1995).
Charter Convmsions

While 621,000 scheduled passengers were carried in the July-December 1995 period,
charter passengers dropped by 175,000 (OIA96). This represented a 29 per cent decrease
in charter operations for Canada. The US carriers experienced a 45 per cent drop in
charter operations but, in absolute figures, this was negligible. Canadian carriers
continued to dominate the charter market. Canadian charter operations in the period
accounted for 6.24 per cent (down fiom 10.23 per cent) of the total transborder market,
but their share of the charter market rose fiom 94 per cent to 95 per cent. This is hardly
surprising, since a significant portion of this market is Canadian passengers heading south
for US "sun destinations",14 and the charter market is the only segment in which Canadian
carriers have a significant cost advantage.
The scheduled operations also grew in absolute terms, but the outlook for Canadian
carriers in terms of market share is somewhat more murky. US carriers, which already
carried close to two-thirds of the passenger trafEc on the existing routes," gained a
greater share (53 per cent) of the increased total traffic in the first year (OAI96).
Pustay (1997: 25) points out that the charter conversions by the Canadian carriers
represented over half of the "new" services by Canadian carriers in the first year of the
agreement, and that these routes are ofken served with less than daily basis. The
si@cance of these services is a matter of interpretation. On one hand, the conversion
creates value for consumers because it simplifies travel between these city-pairs. On the
other, it does not represent "new" service, and in the analysis of changes brought about by
Open Skies, it is fair to treat these conversions as a separate case.
Pustay points out that when conversions are excluded, for instance, the "new" services in
Canada are as concentrated as had been the case under the previous air service agreement,
with Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary receiving 87 per cent of the routes, while
on the US side the top four hubs received only 22 of 70 new routes (1995:25).
This may be explained by a strategy on the part of Air Canada, particularly, to "exploit the
temporary constraints imposed on US carriers" (Pustay 1995: 30) at the airports where
l4 About

two-thirds of total transborder passengers are Canadian (Dresner 1992: 3).
l5 In the period 1983-93, the US carrier share of passengers has ranged fkom a low of 59
per cent in 1989 to a high of 66 per cent in 1993 (Statistics Canada Catalogue 51-205,
1993 -Highlights).
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phase-in provisions were in effect. Another explanation may lie in the linear market
structure of the Canadian market, and the demographics which make Montreal, Toronto,
and Vancouver the natural hub cities. In any case, it implies that the smaller Canadian
cities received somewhat less benefit from Skies than they may have hoped for, at least
initially.
The share of new services between US and Canadian carriers is also highly sensitive to this
sort of analysis. If charter conversions are included, Canadian carriers flew 55 per cent of
the new routes, if they are excluded, this figure drops to 33 per cent (Pustay 1995: 26).
While Air Canada is clearly the most aggressive camer in the transborder market, the
share of services created in the first year may not favour the Canadian carriers as much as
it appears to on the surface.
The significance of the charter conversions remains a matter of outlook and is, in any case,
an artifact of the previous system. The creation of new services has continued in the
second year of the agreement, and preliminary indications are that the transborder market
may have grown by close to 15 per cent again. Even at the more modest growth rates
which can be anticipated for future years, the issue of charter conversions may soon pale
into insignificance.
Intransit Preclearance
The "routes" and "slots" issues were clearly the focus of much of the energy spent in both
the 199 1-92 negotiations and the Framework talks. For Canadian carriers, these were the
largest issues. A third strategic issue, intransit preclearance, was set aside by Elliot and
Kaplan, and was addressed only briefly in the Eramework Preclearance issues, the
Framework stated, should not delay negotiation and implementation of the air
agreement.l6

Intransit preclearance combines the intransit facility common to international hubs with the
preclearance facility for US Customs which has become a feature of Canadian hubs.
Intransit preclearance allows passengers fiom foreign origin points to proceed to US
Customs preclearance without first clearing Canadian Customs. For passengers whose
destination is in the US, this eliminates the need to clear customs or produce visas for a
country they are not visiting.

This relatively obvious extension of existing arrangements was seen partly as a way of
addressing the structural imbalance that preclearance had created. US carriers benefit
from preclearance because it allows them to clear their passengers at the Canadian origin
of the journey, rather than at their US hubs. This eliminates what would otherwise be a
bottle-neck in the hub operation, since many of the passengers are traveling onward to
destinations beyond the hub.

l6

Article XI, page 12.
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Canadian carriers gain no advantage from preclearance because they have no route system
beyond the first US destination, and are therefore indifferent about which end of the
journey their passengers clear customs. Successive Canadian governments have been
unwilling to eliminate preclearance facilities, despite the occasional demands of the
carriers, because it is seen as a convenience to travelers. On the other hand, this
convenience has created a widening advantage for US carriers. Although Canadian
passengers make up close to two-thirds of the transborder passengers, US airlines carry 60
per cent of the traffic.
Intransit preclearance allows Canadian carriers to compete with US gateways for the
behind the gateway tr&c17 and addresses their competitive disadvantage vis-h-vis US
carriers on transborder routes. US Customs vehemently opposed the creation of intransit
preclearance facilities during the 1991-92 negotiating rounds, but Canadian carriers felt
that this was simply a blatant attempt by the US government to keep the economic
advantage for its camers.
The presence of US Customs at the bargaining table in 1991-92 was a major initant to
some Canadian stakeholders, since Customs was viewed as being obstructionist at worst,
and at best an unneeded presence at the table. To this day, some stakeholders express
vitriolic opinions about the waste of negotiating time on issues such as the fact that US
Customs could not carry sidearms in Canada. Canadian stakeholders felt these were
utterly unrelated to air transport. US DOT faced a challenge on this issue, however.
Intransit preclearance was a key Canadian demand, but DOT could not deliver on it. Any
agreement including it required US Customs' agreement, but DOT had no real leverage
over it.
The Elliot-Kaplan solution was to sever this discussion from the rest of the negotiation. It
is not at all clear that this would have been possible with the stakeholders at the table,
partly because of the build-up of resentment, and partly because this issue was growing in
importance as global airline alliances were cemented.
The latter was especially true for Canadi>n. Aside from the cash infbsion, the alliance
with American also presented the opportunity to feed tr&c from American's US and
South American network into Canadi>nYsextensive Pacific route system and vice versa.
The most efficient method for both airlines was to use Canadi>n's Vancouver hub for this
purpose. The new YVR terminal had been designed to include intransit preclearance
facilities. Without US Customs agreement, however, this could not be implemented.
Once preclearance was severed from the frsunework, Elliot and Kaplan created a situation
in which DOT could deliver on all of the remaining Canadian issues. Both governments
could present a package to their stakeholders which was largely unalterable, but
deliverable with a high degree of certainty. On both sides, stakeholders had to weigh the
l7 Behind the

gateway traffic is destined for airports which are not, themselves,
international gateways, but can be accessed through the gateway.

Canadian Carrier Strategies and the 1995 Open Skies Agreement
Presented at the Air Transport Research Group, June 1997 by Raymon J. Kaduck

15

value of a set agreement against the cost of continuing with the status quo. The response
was quick and afl6rmative fi-omcarriers and airport operators on both sides of the border.
The agreement to sever intransit preclearance was an act of faith on the part of the
Canadian government. Without the leverage of an Open Skies negotiation, Canada
reduced its bargaining power on the issue. Short of cabotage, Canada now had nothing to
offer the US which would be sufficient to bring it back to the table. On the other hand,
Canada may have concluded that the politicization of the issue in the context of the larger
negotiation was a source of fiction. Once severed, it could be negotiated between
DFAIT and US Customs without the pressure of economic interests.

In the management of US politics, American Airlines would be a potential ally. American
holds 25 per cent of Canadi>n's equity, and therefore has a direct interest in Canadi>n's
survival. Strategically, it also gains high value from Canadian's routes and slots in the Far
East allowing it to compete more effectively with its domestic rivals' giobd networks.
Recent Developments in Preclearance
The intransit preclearance talks went on for two years after Open Skies entered into force.
In April 1997, the governments announced a pilot project at YVR. This arrangement
allows for intransit preclearance, while at the same time providing US Customs with
enhanced ability to screen foreign passengek, and cooperation between the RCMP and
US Customs in searches.

Currently, the US lacks the right to detain suspects on Canadian soil. In the pilot project,
Canadian police will assist US Customs in the preclearance facility. If the Canadian officer
feels that there are grounds, a search will take place under Canadian law. The US
preclearance facility is in close proximity to the Canadian Customs, allowing for a rapid
clearance of both by transiting passengers.
Extension of the agreement beyond the pilot project will require Parliamentary approval,
since it will have to allow for broader application of US Customs powers. The concept is
that US Customs could search if it had reasonable grounds to believe it was being lied to.
It could then arrest suspects under Canadian law, and detain them until Canadian police
officers arrived. The Canadian government is given until the end of the pilot project on
June 1, 1998 to pass the required legislation.
The increased screening ability uses information fkom the passenger name record (PNR) of
the airline computer reservation system (CRS). This raised concerns, since passing the
whole PNR might constitute a violation of privacy rights guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Until the airlines can provide an electronic record with
the sensitive areas filtered out, the information will be passed in printed form, with these
data blocked out.
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Conclusions
The 1995 Open Skies Agreement has been successll beyond the expectations of even
some of its strongest proponents. The negotiation of the agreement from 1991 to 1995,
reveals a change in the preferences of Canadian carriers, and this has been borne out in
their responses to the agreement. Air Canada, which was protectionist in its philosophy,
and conservativein its strategy at the outset of the 1991 negotiations, has been
transformed into the most aggressive force in the transborder market. Whether this is the
result of the leadership of Hollis Harris, or a general shift in attitude among top
management, is beyond the scope of this paper, however the transformation is striking.
Air Canada now pursues a strategy in which it overflies the US hubs to serve smaller US
markets with direct flights. It uses the Canadair RJ as a tool for market penetration, and
in combiition with larger Airbuses to better manage capacity on its routes. The
economics of the RJ make it ideal for thin routes, while providing consumers with the
opportunity of non-stop travel.
Canadi>n, the more entrepreneurial and less protectionist of the carriers in 1991, has been
limited in it strategy choices by poor financial health. It was badly handicapped by the
debt load it carried into the GulfWar recession, and has not regained the freedom of
action available to its domestic rival. Canadi>n has deepened its fiance with American
Airlines, and the two airlines are adding capacity from US markets into the hub at YVR.
This provides a beneEt to consumers of reduced time to many Asia-Pacific markets, and
provides American the benefit of its partner's routes in the Far East. The implementation
of a pilot program of intransit preclearance at YVR facilitates this strategy.
The two airlines, which had similar approaches but dierent endowments in 1991, have
evoIved very different strategies in the transborder market.
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The International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979
heralded the era of Open Skies in international aviation.

This

paper traces the post-war regulation and then deregulation of
fares, rates, routes, and capacity all the way from Bermuda I
through the partial dismantling of the IATA price fixing
apparatus, discusses the impediments to Open Skies, and examines
the impact on the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

THE POST WORLD WAR I1 ERA OF REGULATION

Following the collapse of the Chicago Conference of 1944 in
resolving the issue of'the regulation of international airline
routes and fares due to the many divergent views of the major
participants, the United States and Britain signed the precedentsetting Bermuda I Agreement in 1946.

Bermuda I granted each

party the five freedoms of the air1 on named routes and for
approved multiple carriers without capacity or flight frequency
restrictions (but which could be imposed ex-post facto), clearly
favoring the United States which then accounted for about 60
percent of the world's passenger airline traffic and which had
the largest and most efficient international airlines.

As a

concession to the British who feared American domination, the
Americans agreed to allow the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) to set international fares and cargo rates,

.

and fifth freedom rights were severely limited. Bermuda I was
precedent-setting and served as the model for future bilateral
aviation agreements between counties, making IATA a virtual fare
setting cartel. But note that in subsequent bilaterals not
involving the United States, capacity and flight frequency was
determined ex-ante with an attempt to evenly split the traffic

•

•

Five Freedoms of the Air:
1.
An airline of one country has the right of innocent
passage to overfly another country en route to a third
country with pro forma approval.
2.
An airline of one country has the right to land in
another country for technical reasons without offering
any commercial service to or from that point.
3.
A n airline has the right to discharge commercial
traffic originating from its own country of registry,
into another country.
4.
An airline has the right to pick up traffic from
another country to be discharged into its own country
of registry.
5.
A n airline has the right to carry traffic between two
countries outside its own country of registry as long
as the flight originates or terminates in its country
of registry.

between the carriers of the two countries, often involving
pooling agreements to evenly share the revenues.'
In 1976, thirty years later, the British gave notice of
termination of Bermuda I, claiming that under the terms of the
treaty, the American carriers had a disproportionate share of the
traffic.

Fearing a complete breakdown of commercial air activity

with Britain, the United States was forced to sign Bermuda I1 in
1977, capitulating to British demands to virtually eliminate
multiple carrier designations, limit the capacity offered, and
give up some of the American fifth freedom or "beyond" rights to
carry traffic between Britain and other countries. Bermuda I1
was a devastating policy setback for the United States which had
always advocated a freely competitive market structure.
On the other hand, in the same year in 1977, Freddy Laker
launched Laker Airways, a charter service that lowered fares on
the North Atlantic blue ribbon route.

In the meantime, non-IATA

air carriers from developing countries particularly in Southeast
Asia were heavily discounting fares by as much as

causing

For a long time, Singapore had a pooling agreement with
Indonesia whereby the revenues generated from traffic between
Singapore and Jakarta were shared, even though Singapore Airlines
carried much more passengers than Garuda. In pooling
arrangements, the carrying airline is compensated for variable
costs, and sometimes there is a limitation clause to limit the
extent of pooling.
See Roy Gowan, address in Proceedings, Papers and Dialogue
from the IATA 14'h International Air Transport Public Relations
Conference, Dublin, October 4-5, 1979, pp. 18-21.

illegal discounting of IATA fares through extra commissions to
travel agents by the associationrs own members.

THE PUSH FOR OPEN SKIES

In 1978, the United States orchestrated three events to show
the international aviation community that her concessions in
Bermuda I1 did not signal a policy change and that she was firmly
committed to a pro-competitive negotiation policy.
First in early 1978, the United State issued a statement
entitled, "Policy for the Conduct of International Air
Transportation," which proclaimed that America will endeavor to
"trade competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions...and
pursue our interests in expanded air transportation and reduced
prices.v4

At the same time, U.S. Department of Transportation

officials made clear that the new policy directives signaled the
denunciation of Bermuda 11.
Second, in the same year, the CAB issued an order directing
the International Air Transport Association to "show cause" as to
why the CAB should not rule that its international tariff

'Hearings before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States
Senate, 9SthCongress Second Session 1978 on S.3363, pp. 19-20.

agreements are no longer in the public interest and therefore
should be di~approved.~
Third, towards the end of 1978, Congress passed the Airline
Deregulation Act which deregulated domestic airline
transportation and provided for the-eventualdemise of the CAB at
the end of 1984, clearly setting the stage for an Open Skies
policy to be pursued internationally.
Soon after, the International Air Transportation Competition
Act (IATCA) of 1979 was passed promulgating, among other things
three categories of goals:
Category I: Multiple carrier designations or traffic rights
for American air carriers with permissive route authority
and without operational restrictions with respect to
capacity and flight frequency to allow them to swiftly
respond to shifts in market demand.
Category 11: Freedom of air carriers to offer fares which
correspond with, and are responsive to, consumer demand.
Category 111: Elimination of discrimination and unfair
competitive practices against American air carriers.
The guiding principles of American negotiating strategies
were to trade competitive 'opportunities rather than oppressive

5Report of the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights
of the Committee on Public Work and Transportation, U.S. House of
Representatives, on the Improvement Needed in the Implementation
of the United States International Aviation Policy (98thCongress
First Session 1983), p. 3.

restrictions and to ensure that mutual concessions were to be of
a liberalizing nature.

It was expected that increased open

competition will result in greater consumer benefits through
increased travel options and reduced fares and rates, improved
airline'efficiencies through more extensive and rational routes
structures, and general increase in economic welfare.

ADVANCES

TOWARD

OPEN SKIES

Soon after the passage of IATCA 1979, the United States
achieved some success in getting multiple carrier designations
and unlimited route authority without operational restrictions
from South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Finland, Belgium, and New
Zealand. Note that the smaller countries, particularly those in
the Far East, by themselves did not generate much third and
fourth freedom traffic with the United States, and were therefore
willing to make liberal concessions to the United States in the
way of multiple carrier rights to all their major airports plus
unlimited fifth freedom beyond rights, in return for the
lucrative fifth freedom traffic going to and from the United
States.

On the other hand, the larger countries such as Japan,

The United Kingdom, France, and Italy by themselves generate a
tremendous amount of third and fourth freedom traffic with the
United States and therefore, unlike the smaller countries, they
were less willing to concede fifth freedom rights without

substantial reciprocity. Also, fearing domination by the larger
and more numerous American carriers, the larger countries
resisted American attempts to obtain multiple carrier traffic
rights and unlimited capacity and flight capacity.

The United

States also had difficulty negotiating with Brazil and other
Latin American countries because the South Americans have always
had a tradition of tight economic control over civil aviation.

The United States had much greater success in seeking
increased freedom of pricing to counter the success of Freddy
Laker Airways which had diverted a large portion of the tourist
market from the scheduled airlines by providing low cost service
across the North Atlantic.

In the first post-Bermuda I1

Agreement signed with Israel in early 1978, the United States
insisted on and got a mutual disapproval provision which ensured
that fares can only be disapproved if both governments disallowed
them.

Shortly after, in an agreement with The Netherlands, the

country-of-origin rule of pricing principle was adopted,
stipulating that each contracting party had the exclusive right
to approve or disapprove prices for one-way or round-trip
carriage commencing in its own territory.

These two liberal

concepts were widely adopted in subsequent bilateral agreements.
(The country-of-origin rule was widely used to liberalize charter
operations worldwide.)

Government intervention in pricing was

generally limited to the prevention of predatory or
discrimination pricing, protection of consumers from unduly high
monopoly fares, and protection of airlines from the prices of
others that are artificially low because of government subsidy.
Perhaps the greatest advances in freedom of pricing were
achieved in Europe where tight economic regulation of fares used
to prevail.

Under the shadow of the 1978 CAB "show cause" order,

the United-Statesmanaged to convince the European Civil Aviation
Conference to agree, on several occasions, to liberalize air
fares within broad zones of reasonableness. These agreements
represent, for the first time, a successful regional approach to
free competitive pricing.
A multilateral aviation agreement with the European Civil
Aviation Conference was signed on October 1984. The price fixing
machinery is complicated, but the basic features are as follows.
Reference fares for round-trip trans-Atlantic scheduled passenger
services between city pairs in the United States and Europe are
established once a year, based on cost and capacity data
supplied.

Different reference fares are set for basic, shoulder,

and peak periods differentiated by country and directionally
defined by the origin of the flight.

Then, different zones of

reasonableness are established for each city pair and for each
class of service.

For instance, in the first year of operation

in 1984, the reference round-trip fares for New York-Frankfurt
(U.S. originating) were as follows:
8

Basic season (September 15 to May 14): $1,221
Peak season (May 15 to September 14):

$1,321

Shoulder season (None)
The initial zones of reasonableness for each class of travel were
as follows:
Dee0 Discount
54-70

Piscount
70-80

Economv

Business

80-120

100-130

First
130 and above

This means that any American or participating European
airline could set a round-trip economy fare of not less than 80%
below or more than 120% above the peak season reference fare of
$1,321 for a passenger traveling economy class from New York to
Frankfurt and back if the flight begins between May 15 and
September 14. As long as the fare is within the prescribed zone
of reasonableness, all participating governments must approve or
"refrain from notifying dissatisfaction" with the fare filed by
the carrier.
Additionally, there have been great advances in liberalizing
bilaterals among European countries.

The United Kingdom in

particular has led with liberal bilaterals with The Netherlands,
West Germany, Ireland, and Luxembourg.

IMPEDIMENTS TO OPEN SKIES

There are many obstacles to open competition associated with
Open Skies.

One of them is the issue of public subsidies.

It

was well known that the money-losing Anglo-French Concorde was
viable only because of heavy subsidies by the British and French
governments. Alitalia fell so far into the red one year that the
Italian government simply converted its existing dept into
equity, thus relieving the inefficient airline of its huge
interest burden.

But no airline was more favored by subsidies

than the SAS because it is supported not by one but by the three
governments of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Also, many airlines
are encouraged by their governments to operate below cost to
establish an identity in new markets.

Ireland's Aer Lingus, for

example, operated the North Atlantic routes at a loss, as its
main function was to bring tourists to Ireland.

And some

carriers even receive free government goods and service^.^
But the more serious impediment to free enterprise in
international aviation is the prevalence of discriminatory
practices.

Listed below are some examples:

Many foreign governments ensure that their flag carriers
have the inside track.

For example, the Portuguese

government makes a list of Portugese emigrants available to
her national carrier, TAP.

For a long time, Canada insisted

that all immigrants travel to Canada on Canadian airlines.
Brazilian laws provide incentives for shippers to use native

See Civil Aeronautics Board, Government Ownership,
Subsidy, and Economic Assistance in International Commercial
Aviation (Washington, 1975)

.

air carriers.
e

Many foreign countries insist that foreign airlines must use
their exclusive ground handling services which provide
expensive and inefficient services in Italy, Argentina,
Ecuador, Japan, Kenya, and Peru. At Tokyo's Narita Airport,
for example, in the past only Japan Airlines had a dedicated
and fully computerized cargo terminal.

It has also been

recorded that warehousing and customs requirements were at
least at one time discriminatory in Belgium, Canada, France,
West Germany, Italy, Mexico, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and
the United Kingdom.
In the area of reservation control, the airlines of
countries such as France, Italy, and Germany deliberately
place American carriers at a disadvantage by denying them
full access to their computerized reservations systems.
Worse still, in Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and
Scandinavia, the national airlines not only own some of the
travel agents (illegal in the United States), but they also
control what the agents can see on their screens.
Many governments charge excessive user fees at their
international gateways to cross subsidize their smaller
airports which are usually used only by their domestic
airlines.

Japan imposed a "noise charge" most heavily on

transoceanic B747 aircraft although these wide bodied jumbo
jets are quieter than the noisy narrow bodied jets used on
11

Japan's domestic network.

In U.S. Congressional hearings,

it was reported that American planes were charged $1.53 a
gallon for jet fuel in Israel while the national carrier was
only charged $1.00.

And India once charged a fuel tax only

on international charters because essentially she did not
operate them.
o

Finally, even if under discriminatory conditions, foreign
carriers make a profit in some countries, they face currency
conversion problems in Ghana, India, Kenya, Nigeria,
Pakistan, and Taiwan.

Sometimes there is a total blockage

of remittances altogether, which caused Pan American to
to completely withdraw from Zaire.
Continued dissatisfactions with the disproportionate amount
of fifth freedom traffic carried by American air carriers has
also
acted as a brake towards the Open Skies concept.

In this regard,

Germany reached an agreement in 1993 with the United States
spelled out in a Memorandum of Consultation, in which the US
agreed to a two-year freeze on the number of flights to Germany
to allow Lufthansa time to restructure and privatize.

Several

countries, including Japan and France, have indicated their
intentions to renegotiate bilaterals with the US, citing similar
complaints of imbalance in the carriage of fifth freedom traffic.

THE ENCIRCLEMENT STRATEGY

The Director of the Bureau of Pricing and Domestic Aviation
at the now defunct Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) had, in a memo
dated 26 January 1979, outlined the Encirclement strategy.' He
noted that pressure could be placed on Italy and France through
whatever increased competition could be negotiated with Greece,
Spain, Portugal, and Yugoslavia.

Britain, on the other hand,

could be pressured to concede to American demands by concluding
liberal agreements with neighboring countries such as Belgium,
The Netherlands, and Finland. All of these will serve to divert
Italian, French and British-bound traffic to other European
gateways served by cheaper scheduled services and inexpensive
charters which were now governed by the liberalizing country-oforigin rules.

The same Encirclement Strategy was used against

Japan, using the liberal bilateral agreements concluded with
South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand as leverage.
Subsequent and recent developments have shown that the
Encirclement Strategy worked, Britain was forced into
renegotiating Bermuda I1 and accepting more liberalizing terms,'
France was forced into coming around, Germany was induced to sign
a more liberal bilateral because of concerns that KLM might make

7nCivil Aeronautics Memo by
- Michael E . Levine," A v i a t i o n
D a i l y (March 8 , 1979), pp. 1-7.

A number of liberal amendments to Bermuda I1 were signed
between 1978 and 1982.

inroads into its US-Germany traffic, and Japan eventually had to
accede to American demands for multiple carrier designations.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Increased route and carrier liberalization in turn led to
strategic global alliances, of which the major ones are:
British Airways, Qantas, Air Russia, and US Air
8

KLM a<d Northwest Airlines

American Airlines and Canadian Airlines
Air Canada and Continental Airlines
Air France and Sabena
SAS and British Midland
Delta, Swissair, and Singapore Airlines
8

United, Lufthansa, and Thai International

e

American Airlines and Japan Airlines

8

Japan Airlines and Lufthansa
The advantages of strategic alliances are in coordinated

promotions and frequent-flier programs, code sharing to gain
priority in computer reservation systems, coordinated flight
schedules for improved.networking, sharing of airport terminal
space, and overall economies of scale.

Global alliances are the

result of liberalization in international aviation but they also
promote Open Skies in that international corporate linkages and
interests break down national barriers.

Another recent development is the complete or partial
privatization of national flag carriers such as British Airways,
Air Canada, Alitalia, SAS, Lufthansa, KLM, SABENA, and Qantas.
Pakistan, Brazil, and South Africa are making efforts to
privatize their flag carriers.

Privatization of airlines does

much to remove much of the incentive for governments to protect
them, thus paving the way for open competition.
With privatization and deregulation comes consolidation.
For example, Australia deregulated its domestic airline industry
in 1990, soon privatized government owned Qantas and Australian,
and then in 1992 the two airlines merged.

Domestic mergers are

often desirable to position the strengthened carrier to play a
larger role in global alliances3 or to compete with other mega
carriers. Partly for this reason, Air France was allowed to
acquire UTA and Air Inter and British Airways was allowed to
merge with British Caledonian. But consolidation reduces
competition in domestic markets which makes liberalized
bilaterals more attractive.

EXPORTING DEREGULATION AND OPEN S K I E S

The overall success of airline deregulation in the United
States since 1978 served as a model to other countries.

In 1987

Canada deregulated airline operations in the southern half of the

' Oum,

Taylor, and Zhang (1995) make a strong case for this.
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country, called for more liberal bilateral agreements, and was
soon followed by Australia in 1990.

Restrictions in bilateral

agreements between European Community (EC) countries are being
eliminated as part of the overall unification effort, tolerating
delayed compliance by the less developed nations.

The goal is

towards full liberalization of international aviation within the
European Community to further reduce national borders, looking
forward to-complete Open Skies in 1997. Member states of the
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) have expressed interest in
joining the EC Open Skies.

The concept of a Single European

Market (1992) as advocated by the EC Council of Ministers and the
broader based ECAC offers the prospect of replacing bilateralism
with regionalism, permitting the unrestricted carriage of sixth
freedom traffic (for example, Lufthansa can pick up traffic in
London and carry it to Rome via Frankfurt). As barriers to free
trade are rapidly removed, the Europeans will move one step
further and negotiate with other countries on a multilateral
basis .I0
The recent United States-Canada bilateral aviation agreement
signed in 1995 permits American and Canadian airlines to serve
al.1 points in either country, with a three-year phase-in period
for additional service by US carriers to Toronto, Montreal, and
Vancouver expiring by 1998, and with fares subject to the doublelo Such negotiations were approved for non EC countries such
as Norway and Sweden.

disapproval standard (to be disallowed only if both countries
agree to do so to prevent predatory or monopolistic pricing).''
Note that a transborder Open Skies regime had already existed
between the United States and Mexico.
The Japanese government has recently proposed the creation
of a transborder Open Skies market for Japan, Korea, and China.
In fact, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Hong Kong already have fairly
liberal access to each other's market. Also, the Association of
South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been discussing the
possibility of creating a liberalized air transport bloc in the
region.

It appears that with the exception of China which has

traditionally pursued restrictive policies in bilateral
negotiations, the Far East will follow the lead of the United
States and Europe in the pursuit of Open Skies.
Today, the only parts of the world that have resisted Open
Skies are South America (with the exception of Chile, Equador,
and Panama), Africa, and the Middle East.

IMPACT ON IATA

When the Civil Aeronautics Board issued the "show cause"
order in 1978, the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
reacted strongly by accusing the United States of forcing

"A similar closer Economic Relationship Agreement was
signed between Australia and New Zealand creating a Single
Aviation Market.

American anti-trust laws on to the rest of the world.
Nevertheless, after an internal study and several meetings, IATA
agreed to restructure itself in 1979.
Soon after its inception in Havana in 1945, IATA assumed its
role as a regulator of international air fares occasioned by
Bermuda-type bilateral agreements.

Three regional traffic

conferences were created and generally met once every two years
to establish international fares and rates. All fares had to be

unanimously approved by both the participating member airlines as
well as their respective governments before they could be
enforced, again generally for two years. Agreements were
published in the Manual of Traffic Conference Resolutions.
Airlines that charged more or less than what was agreed were
heavily fined.
The restructuring in 1979 resulted in IATA activities being
grouped into trade association activities covering legal,
technical, baggage, clearinghouse, and ticketing functions, and
tariff coordinating activities for setting fares and rates.

With

respect to tariff coordinating functions, IATA does not generally
regulate international-faresin the North American and European
markets, which are now governed mostly by multilateral agreements

.

m

with broad zones of reasonableness and carrier-specific fares.-In Asia, three large non-IATA airlines (Singapore, Thai

l2

See Dresner (1981).

International, and Cathay Pacific) forced IATA member airlines
such as Japan Airlines to respond in their territory with nonIATA-sanctioned or open rated fares to meet the competition.

In

the rest of the world, rate making traffic conferences have been
replaced by smaller sub-group meetings.

Fare agreements are for

shorter periods, usually for six months, and often, unanimous
consent is no longer required.13 Where competition from non-IATA
airlines or charters is fierce

,

zones of reasonableness or even

open rated fares have been adopted to allow member airlines to
set competitive prices and to accommodate changing market
conditions. Thus, for all intents and purposes, IATA is no
longer the fare setting cartel it once was.

Most of its

functions today involve trade association activities.

CONCLUSION

Despite impediments, setbacks, and recalcitrant states, the
United States has led the world inexorably towards an
international regime of Open Skies with multiple carrier
designations and unrestricted access to gateway cities without
capacity constraints and free of discriminatory practices, and
with the right to set competitive fares and rates to meet market

For a discussion of voting procedures at IATA tariff
conferences, see Haanappel, Peter P.C. (1984), Pricing and
Capacity Determination in International Air Transport, Deventer,
The Netherlands: Kluwer.
i3

demand for all six freedoms of the air traffic.

Domestic

deregulation, the creation of regional aviation blocs and
multilateral negotiations, privatization and consolidation of
airlines, and global alliances all contribute towards the
deregulation of international aviation.

But the ultimate goal of

international Open Skies is the mutual granting of the rights of
cabotage, allowing foreign airlines to operate flights serving
domestic city pairs.
Although the American-Canadian Bilateral Agreement of 1995 did
not go far enough in removing the traditional prohibition on
cabotage, fearing foreign domination of domestic aviation, there
are already steps taken in this direction. When Australia and
New Zealand signed the Closer Economic Relationship Agreement,
Air New Zealand was allowed to operate on Australian domestic
routes beginning in 1993, essentially granting it the right of
cabotage. Also, in 1997 when the European Community completely
embraces Open Skies, all European airlines will enjoy the rights
of cabotage within the community.
international skies be truly open.

Only then will the
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Outline

Objective of the modeling exercise - Context
measuring Gains from liberalization
understanding distribution of gains (losses)
understanding marginal gains (losses) from policy
changes
Alternative Approaches
Australian Model
Institute for International Economics
Transport Canada
Key Elements of the Model
trade deflection
changes in choice
changes in quality
theory supplemented with empirical work
Cost Side (time permitting)
Summary & Assessment

Context- What is the problem we are trying to understand?
Illustrating Four Country North Pacific Air Transportation
Network and Canada-Japan Liberalization
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What are we tryinn to assess?
Categorization of International Air Transport Policy Regimes
MARKET ACCESS

DESIGNATION

CAPACITY/
FREQUENCY
CONTROLS
TARIFFS

RESTRICTIVE
MODERATE
-No 5th Freedoms
-Limited 5th
-Single Point Access Freedoms
-Multiple with
Specific Access
Points Restricted
-Single Designation -Multiple Designation
-No Foreign
with Restrictions
Ownership
-Limited Foreign
Ownership
-Agreement Between -Increases Subject
Airlines
to Approval
-Predetermined
(Quota)
-Airline Agreement
-Refer to IATA
Mandatory
-Single Disapproval

FACILITATING
-Full 5th Freedom
Rights
-Open Access to All
Points
-Multiple Designation
-No Ownership
Restrictions
-No Controls

-Double Disapproval

Welfare Analysis for Change in Bilateral Agreements

I

Airfare

($1

Cost (UC ,)
Cost (UC,)

Q2

Q (# of Passengers)

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

Australian Model
Summary of Annualized Estimates of Welfare Channe
(market responses to four liberalization scenarios)

World welfare
Australian welfare
Australia's airline
Australian passengers
Australian tourists
Foreign welfare
Foreign airlines
New entrant
Foreign passengers

Annualized estimate of welfare
change ($ millions)
Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4a, 4b or Stage 4c
23
46
21
0
-27
2 -14
-20
-25
-3 1
-14
-33
-33
-33
-33
9
7
3
0
-5
4
3
1
0
-2
22
60
41
25
4
-30
5
2
0
-2
21
35
34
33
32
34
29
13
0
-18

Institute for International Economics

Possible Cost Savings To Users From Competitive
Aviation Service In 2010 And For The Period 1997-2010
(billions of dollars)
Country

Cost savings in 2010

Cumulative cost savings,

$
7
Australia
$1
.O
Canada
Hong Kong
Japan
Korea
Malaysia
Singapore
Total
Source: Hufbauser and Findlay (1996)

$21.7

$152

Key Elements of the Model

Changes in varietv or choice
Follows literature of Armington (1966), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
introducing preferences for differentiated products is to assume variety of goods
Modeling of greater variety has followed the use of concave symmetric subutility
functions such as Ui (qil, qi2, ...,ql)
I where qil is the quantity of variety 1 to be consumed
out of expenditure category i
useful form of utility function

I.E. UTILITY INCREASES WITH VARIETY

Theorv supplemented with empirical work

top down versus bottom up approach

-

Starting point two stage budgeting process
Stage 1: consumers allocate expenditures between the aggregate "real travel on this

OD" and all other goods.
Stage 2: allocation of "total real travel" across individual routes.

Unit of analysis is the flight segment (consistency with demand and cost)
Distinguish aggregate OD demand and route demand for OD pair

Air Transport Liberalization Model (Demand Side)

1.

Q" = f (~*",otherO~)

2.

P*=

*

(pf ,***,PR)

Total Passenger Demand (over routes R)
Real price index function (suppress OD)
quality adjusted route demands

4.

(2 =

*

*

(41, - * , q ~)

real quantity index

Procedure:
1.derive total OD quality adjusted demand Q given the level of the price index P*

2.derive individual route demands from the price aggregator using Shepherd's
Lemma and the second of the two-stage budgeting process.

5.

Quality adjusted passenger demand on route r is:
given P* on route r, and Q

Quality Adjusted to Actual Demand
*

6.

q r = ar ( x r ) q r
*- 1
Pr

-

q*r quality adjusted units of real service,

ar ( x J P r

1consumers actually buy the physical quantity q;- at price v;. but from a utility point of I
-

view purchase

* at price * per unit of quality-adjusted demand.

* *

7. Given linearity in q,* we have prqr = prqr
8.

Hedonic price index on route r is: p: = pra, (A,,tr ,other, )

9.

Actual passenger demand on route r is q, = a, 6'v(P*)
*

10. Total passenger demand across all routes

Q

n

eToT
= zqr
r

11. Own price elasticity on route r is 'log qr = q, = & + qdsrwhere
1'% pr
*
'logq:
and E, = -(I- S,)U (if aggregator is CES)
4rr =
'log pr

Route Entry and Exit (deriving demand as rlcarriers changes)
12. P(pl,***,pr)=

whereo= 1- p, where p I 1, p + 0
i.e. use Armington Aggregator for real price index and to
adjust share coefficients to allocate new demand across
routes consistent with observed carrier characters.

13. An example of route expansion:

C

if 0=2

P*(3) = 0.444; i.e. R(2) to R(3) = 56%

14. Demand for individual route is given by

& in real price

Summary of DemandModel

A. Use to calculate consumer welfare and demand

consequences of

(1) A route choices,
(2) A in quality,

(3) A in fares

B. Deals with inter-route substitution in network context.
C. process of calculation of demand on route r (given list
of prices on all routes):
compute value of aggregate price index (equation 12)
calculate real quantity index Q*
calculate individual route demands (equation
D. In consumer equilibrium, total expenditures in OD
R

market = E =

prq,
r=l

Summary of Market Simulations
Scenario Description:

price)
Consumer Benefits to Canada
Consumer Benefits to others
Prodticer Benefits
Producer profit (loss ) Canada
Producer Profit (loss) Others
Producer Benefits (Loss) Canada

Restrictive to Moderate

30%
70%

20%
80%
flarge
decrease)
1 small
increase
(large
proportion)

Source: Gillen, Harris and Oum (1996)

I

Restrictive to Moderate

30%
70%

medium
to (small
large increase decrease)
small increase I small increase
large
proportion

(large
proportion)

30%
70%

equal
equal

equal
equal

large increase

small increase

large increase

I small increase I large decrease I small (loss) I
large
proportion

large
proportion

large
proportion

I

I
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